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Regulation of Emerging Risks
Matthew T. Wansley*
Why has the EPA not regulated fracking? Why has the FDA not
regulated e-cigarettes? Why has NHTSA not regulated autonomous vehicles?
This Article argues that administrative agencies predictably fail to regulate
emerging risks when the political environment for regulation is favorable. The
cause is a combination of administrative law and interest group politics.
Agencies must satisfy high initial informational thresholds to regulate, so they
postpone rulemaking in the face of uncertainty about the effects of new
technologies. But while regulators passively acquire more information,
fledgling industries consolidate and become politically entrenched. By the time
agencies can justify regulation, the newly entrenched industries have the
political capital to thwart them.
This Article offers a prophylactic against this predictable regulatory
failure. It defends an experimentalist model of regulation, in which agencies are
empowered to impose moratoria on risky emerging technologies while
regulators organize experiments to learn about the risks they pose and the
means to mitigate them. The agency-coordinated experiments would expedite
the promulgation of empirically informed rules. The moratoria would extend
the political window for regulatory action and protect the public in the interim.
The Article applies this experimentalist model to the regulation of fracking, ecigarettes, and autonomous vehicles. It also identifies legal strategies for
implementing experimental regulation under existing law. It challenges the
conventional wisdom that agencies should postpone regulation until they can
confidently predict the effects of new risky technologies.
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INTRODUCTION
Emerging risks differ from other risks that the state regulates
in two ways. The first is epistemic: the information necessary to answer
potentially dispositive questions about how the risk should be regulated
will not be available when regulators first become aware of the
technology. For example, regulators do not currently know whether
fracking contaminates groundwater, whether e-cigarettes help smokers
quit, or what effects autonomous vehicles will have on the rate of
collisions.1 But effective regulation of each of these risks requires
answers to these basic questions.
The second is political: emerging risks create a brief window
during which a wide range of regulatory interventions are politically
viable. But that window can quickly elapse as interest groups and social
norms become entrenched. Before fracking became intertwined in our
economy and e-cigarettes became widely used, there was no powerful,
organized interest group coalition opposing regulation. Now, even if
evidence accumulates that suggests restrictions are justified, restrictive
regulation may no longer be possible. The window for a safe transition
to autonomous vehicles may also close suddenly if a high-profile
collision turns public opinion against the technology.
There is a mismatch between existing administrative law and
these features of emerging risks. The conventional rulemaking process
requires agencies to satisfy high, early informational hurdles that they
would struggle to meet when regulating emerging risks. A regulatory
agency must generally give notice of a proposed rule, provide an
opportunity for comments on the proposed rule, and respond to those
comments.2 It must also conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the rule.3
After an agency promulgates the rule, the rule will be subject to judicial

1.
For a review of the evidence on each of these issues, see infra Part IV.
2.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012) (“[N]otice of proposed rule making shall be published in
the Federal Register . . . After notice . . . the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity
to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or
without opportunity for oral presentation.”).
3.
Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012) (“[E]ach agency must . . . propose or
adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs . . . .”).
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review, and the agency will be expected to justify its substantive
decisions during the rulemaking process.4
Each of these hurdles can be insurmountable obstacles to
regulating emerging risks. An agency may lack sufficient information
to respond to skeptical comments from regulated parties. It could offer
only speculative predictions about a rule’s costs and benefits. It would
create a rulemaking record vulnerable to judicial challenge.
Consequently, agencies often postpone regulating emerging risks. But
while agencies wait to acquire more information, interest groups
organize and social norms crystallize. When agencies are prepared to
regulate, the political window for optimal regulation may have elapsed.
This Article proposes that regulatory agencies should be granted
a new set of powers to regulate emerging risks. Specifically, agencies
should be empowered to (1) organize experiments with new risky
technologies; and (2) impose moratoria or other limits on the use of
those technologies outside of the experimental conditions. Agencies
would be able to initiate these powers without having to satisfy the
procedural requirements of the conventional rulemaking process, and
some of their decisions would be protected from judicial review. But the
powers would be temporary and limited in scope. Once the experiments
conclude, agencies would need to proceed to rulemaking or end the
moratoria.
The new powers would enable early, effective regulation of
emerging risks. The experiment power would allow agencies to rapidly
acquire reliable information about the risk and how to regulate it. The
moratorium power would protect against interference with
experimental conditions and prevent the political window for regulatory
action from elapsing while the experiments were ongoing. The time and
scope limits would protect against agencies using these powers as a de
facto regulatory tool.
This Article defends the utility of these specific legal reforms.
But they are intended to illuminate a new way of thinking about how
public policy should respond to emerging risks. The Article contrasts
this new model with the three main alternative models for regulating
emerging risks: (1) the Precautionary model5—banning new risky

4.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012) (providing that courts shall “hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” or “unsupported by substantial evidence”).
5.
See generally, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM
NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010).
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technologies until they are proven safe; (2) the Common Law model6—
allowing market innovation until regulation is proven cost-benefit
justified; and (3) the Laboratory of Democracy model7—relying on state
and local governments to test out regulatory solutions and choosing the
best.8
Each of these models has its disadvantages. The Precautionary
model does not provide a determinate answer when a new technology
both creates new risks and mitigates existing risks, unless the state
simply bans all potentially risky technologies regardless of their
benefits and forgoes socially useful innovation. The Common Law
model allows for market innovation, but also permits interest groups to
entrench themselves and impede even cost-benefit justified regulation.
The Laboratory of Democracy model can start a race to the bottom, in
which the regulatory regime that most favors firms’ interests wins out.
Critically, none of these models provide a mechanism for what
the regulation of emerging risks needs most: rigorously controlled
experiments that produce useful knowledge about which regulatory
response is best. This Article defends an Experimentalist model for
regulating emerging risks, building on recent scholarship arguing for a
greater use of randomized experiments in regulation.9 The
Experimentalist model aims to maximize the potential for regulatory
learning, while preserving regulatory options.
This new model should not apply to all areas of risk regulation.
For many risks, from asbestos to climate change, the relevant science
is settled, so there is little marginal value to publicly organized
experiments. For other risks, especially catastrophic risks, randomized
experiments might not be feasible or ethical. Some risks are latent for
decades, so controlled experiments would take too long for any
concurrent moratoria to be meaningfully temporary. Likewise, when
science learns of a new risk from old technologies—for example, when
we learn that plastics are leaching endocrine disruptors10—imposing a

6.
See generally, e.g., Henry N. Butler, A Defense of Common Law Environmentalism: The
Discovery of Better Environmental Policy, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705 (2008); Roger Meiners &
Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 923 (1999).
7.
See generally, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
8.
See infra Part II.
9.
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 929, 931–33 (2011); Zachary J. Gubler, Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. REV. 129, 129–30
(2014).
10. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ENV’T. PROGRAMME & WORLD HEALTH ORG., STATE OF THE
SCIENCE OF ENDOCRINE DISRUPTING CHEMICALS – 2012, iii (Åke Bergman et. al. eds., 2013),
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moratorium would be difficult because the relevant interest groups
might have already mobilized. Most importantly, although experiments
would help resolve questions of fact, they provide no help with questions
of value that regulators inevitably confront. Few experts dispute that
obesity has become a significant public health problem.11 But the
regulatory choices—and the questions of moral and political philosophy
that underlie them—remain labyrinthine.
Experiments and moratoria can be useful for a heterogeneous
set of sources of emerging risks: consumer products, industrial
processes, and the byproducts of research in science and engineering.
To this Article’s list of fracking, e-cigarettes, and autonomous vehicles,
one might add genetically modified organisms,12 nanotechnology,13 or
other emerging risks. But the most important risks to regulate may be
those that have yet to emerge. So while the Article proposes solutions
to three current issues in risk regulation, the point of the examples is
to give some empirical plausibility to the claim that agencies ought to
have the experiment and moratorium powers available to address
emerging risks in the future.
Fully institutionalizing an Experimentalist model of regulation
would require a new statute authorizing the experiment and
moratorium powers. That one statute could be leveraged to solve a
broad set of recurring problems in health, safety, and environmental
regulation. As long as a new, risky technology fits within the
substantive areas of risk that an agency was statutorily authorized to
regulate, the experiment and moratorium powers could be used to
regulate the risk. But because the prospect of adopting any new
regulatory statute in the current political environment is minimal,14 the
Article concludes with second-best strategies for partially
implementing the Experimentalist model under existing law.
http://www.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/78101/1/9789241505031_eng.pdf [http://perma.cc/AK7LBTPJ].
11. E.g., Barbara L. Atwell, Obesity, Public Health, and the Food Supply, 4 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 3, 3 (2007) (“It is undisputed that obesity is one of the major public health concerns of our
day.”).
12. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically
Modified Foods, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 403–06 (2002) (advocating a more precautionary
approach for regulation of genetically modified foods).
13. See, e.g., Gregory Mandel, Nanotechnology Governance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1323, 1325–26
(2008) (discussing nanotechnology and its current regulation, and suggesting improvements in its
regulatory scheme).
14. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 5 (2014) (observing that “Congress has not passed a major environmental statute in nearly
a quarter-century, nor has it produced more than incremental reforms to federal energy legislation
during that time, despite dramatic technological, economic, and social changes in these fields that
would seem to demand a legislative response.”).
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The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the mismatch
between existing administrative law and the features of emerging risks.
Part II critiques the alternative models that scholars have proposed for
regulating emerging risks. Part III presents the Experimentalist model
and defends granting agencies experiment and moratorium powers.
Part IV applies that model to the regulation of fracking, e-cigarettes,
and autonomous vehicles. Part V proposes second-best strategies for
partially implementing experiment and moratorium powers under
existing law.
I. MISMATCH BETWEEN EXISTING LAW AND EMERGING RISKS
Administrative law conditions an agency’s rulemaking power on
the agency satisfying a series of informational hurdles. The most
important of these are (1) notice and comment rulemaking; (2) costbenefit analysis; and (3) judicial review. Scholars have long contested
the utility of these hurdles for most rules.15 I take no position on these
larger debates; I address only the desirability of these information
hurdles for rules designed to regulate emerging risks.
I defend three claims about existing law and its effects on
emerging risks. First, for many emerging risks, there will be a gap
between the information an agency will have about the risk and its
possible means of mitigation, and the information the agency needs to
satisfy these information hurdles. Second, as a result of this gap,
agencies will often postpone regulation of emerging risks as they wait
to acquire more information. Third, while agencies wait, the political
environment for regulation may change, and the rule that an agency
later determines to be justified may no longer be politically viable.
I cannot prove any of these claims in the abstract. The only way
to offer evidence for these claims is with specific examples. Part IV
demonstrates each of these claims—the gap between the information
the agency has and the information it would need to regulate, the
postponement of regulation, and the change in political economy during
that postponement—for both fracking and e-cigarettes. It also offers
suggestive evidence that these claims might be true for autonomous
vehicles as well. My hope is that these empirical examples will convince
the reader that the more general claims are likely to be true.
This Part analyzes in more detail the informational hurdles that
existing law requires and the mismatch they create for emerging risks.
It then explains why the political economy for regulation might change
as an agency waits to acquire information to meet those hurdles.
15.

See infra notes 19–22, 24, 26–34, 36–42 and accompanying text.
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A. Existing Law
The law governing administrative rulemaking comes from four
sources: the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),16 organic statutes,
judicial doctrines, and executive orders. These sources of law have
largely congealed into a standardized procedure for agency rulemaking.
First, an agency provides notice of a proposed rule and facilitates public
comment on the rule. Second, the agency conducts an analysis of a rule’s
costs and benefits. Third, the final rule is subject to judicial review.
1. Notice and Comment Rulemaking
Under the APA, rulemaking starts when an agency publishes a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register, which must
include “either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved.”17 The agency must then
provide “interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments,” and,
after considering those public comments, the agency must “incorporate
in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose.”18 The agency must also keep a public record of the rulemaking
process, which includes “copies or an index of written factual material,
studies, and reports relied on or seriously consulted by agency
personnel in formulating the proposed” rule.19
Although these procedural requirements may sound modest, in
practice they place substantial informational demands on agencies.
Through judicial interpretation, “the APA requirement that agencies
must attach a ‘concise general statement of basis and purpose’ to final
rules . . . has blossomed into a requirement that agencies provide a
‘reasoned explanation’ for rules and that they rationally respond to
outside comments passing a ‘threshold requirement of materiality.’ “20
Therefore, agencies must offer reasons for their own decisions in

16. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2012).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2012).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
19. Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, American Bar Association,
Special Feature, A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 34
(2002). But see id. at 35 (“The obligation to disclose written factual material, studies, and reports
relied on or seriously consulted by agency personnel is limited to materials whose disclosure would
be required under the Freedom of Information Act.”).
20. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1385, 1400 (1992) (quoting Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C.
Cir. 1973)).
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rulemaking and reasons in response to comments from private parties
that will satisfy reviewing courts.
Firms that seek to avoid regulation can strategically use the
informational demands of notice and comment rulemaking to delay or
prevent new rules. For example, they can deliberately flood the agency
with comments, knowing that the agency will be held accountable for
responding to them during judicial review.21 Agencies are therefore
faced with the choice of expending precious resources to respond in
detail, ignoring the comments and risking judicial invalidation of the
rule, or forgoing regulation altogether. Because agencies often elect to
forgo regulation, some scholars have argued that the rulemaking
process has ossified.22
Regardless of whether the rulemaking process has become too
demanding in general, the notice and comment requirements are
crippling when agencies seek to regulate emerging risks. In this
context, agencies often lack the facts to offer a reasoned justification for
their rules, and they are often unable to rebut regulated parties’
comments raising doubts about the proposed rule in light of factual
uncertainties. Consequently, agencies face strong pressure to forgo
regulation of emerging risks.
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis
A series of executive orders, uninterrupted since the Reagan
administration, require agencies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of
certain proposed rules.23 Some regulatory statutes impose a cost-benefit

21. See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1329–34 (2010) (explaining how a commitment to open government in the
administrative system allows regulated firms to use the informational requirements of the
rulemaking process strategically).
22. See McGarity, supra note 20, at 1426 (“As long as . . . agency decisionmakers believe that
they must expend additional resources in anticipation of overly intrusive judicial review, they will
be reluctant to undertake new rulemaking initiatives, to experiment with more flexible regulatory
techniques, and to revisit old rulemaking efforts.”). Scholars dispute whether the empirical
evidence supports the claim that the rulemaking process has ossified. See Jason Webb Yackee &
Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal
Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1445–64 (2012)
(examining success rates of proposed rules at the Department of the Interior to argue that evidence
of ossification as a serious problem appears weak). But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking
Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493,
1495–1503 (2012) (analyzing Testing the Ossification Thesis to point out deficiencies in the study
and suggesting improvements to better understand the breadth of ossification issues).
23. For the current Executive Order, see Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012)
(“[E]ach agency must . . . propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that
its benefits justify its costs . . . .”).

410

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:2:401

mandate as well.24 The centralized Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (“OIRA”), which reviews significant regulatory actions,25 has
institutionalized the practice of cost-benefit analysis and expanded its
use across the administrative state.26
Cost-benefit analysis provides a decision-making procedure for
regulation: acquire information about the relevant risk and the effects
of potential rules to regulate it and select a rule for which the expected
benefits exceed the expected costs.27 Its proponents claim that it can
counteract cognitive bias in regulatory decision-making,28 solve
regulatory principal-agent problems,29 and police regulatory capture.30
It has also been the target of persistent criticisms.31
One frequent criticism of cost-benefit analysis is that it requires
exhaustive, specific information for its calculations to be meaningful
and, in practice, that information is often unclear, incomplete, or
unavailable.32 I take no position on the general question of whether the
informational demands of cost-benefit analysis are so frequently
disproportionate to what is available that regulators should abandon
24. For a discussion of the relationship between statutory cost-benefit mandates and the
practice of cost-benefit analysis, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE 12–15 (2003).
25. A regulatory action is “significant” if it will “[h]ave an annual effect on the economy of
$100 million or more” or if it satisfies at least one of four other criteria. Exec. Order No. 12,866 §
3(f), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994).
26. For more on OIRA, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013); and Nicholas Bagley &
Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 (2006).
27. Some defenders of cost-benefit analysis defend it as an optimization tool. See, e.g., Steve
P. Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approach to
Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 991 (2001) (arguing in favor of a
marginal-cost–marginal-benefit analysis). But in practice agencies using cost-benefit analysis
more often choose a rule for which the expected benefits range exceeds the expected costs range.
For examples, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six
Questions (And Almost As Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167 (2014).
28. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1059
(2000) (“[Cost-benefit analysis] is most plausibly justified on cognitive grounds—as a way of
counteracting predictable problems in individual and social cognition.”).
29. See Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political
Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1197 (2001) (“Many of the philosophical difficulties
with cost-benefit analysis disappear when a principal-agent perspective is taken.”).
30. See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and
Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1370 (2013) (defending cost-benefit analysis’s role in
regulatory review on the ground that it has “the potential to reduce agency capture”).
31. For leading criticisms of cost-benefit analysis, see generally ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING,
supra note 5; KYSAR, supra note 5.
32. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Precautionary Principle: Can
They Be Reconciled?, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 771, 777–78 (2013); Thomas O. McGarity, A CostBenefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 12–13 (1998); Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The
Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53
DUKE L.J. 1619, 1723 (2004).
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the methodology altogether. Cost-benefit analysis may very well be
better, for most areas of risk regulation, than alternative decision
procedures.33
But cost-benefit analysis is particularly unsuited to the
regulation of emerging risks. Even defenders of cost-benefit analysis
have conceded that information deficits can diminish its utility.34 Any
cost or benefit predictions that an agency could offer in the analysis of
a proposed rule to regulate an emerging risk would be speculative at
best. The cost and benefit ranges produced by the analysis would
provide little guidance for the choices that an agency would need to
make in deciding which, if any, rule to promulgate. OIRA would be
rightly skeptical of the agency’s figures, and the rule might not survive
its review. Therefore, agencies may avoid an unproductive and
unsuccessful cost-benefit analysis by deciding not to regulate at all.
3. Judicial Review
The APA permits courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”35
Some scholars argue that judicial review of agency action ensures
statutory compliance,36 allows monitoring of agencies,37 prevents

33. As one defense of cost-benefit analysis puts it, “[A]t least it is quite plausible to think
that [cost-benefit analysis], suitably modified to function as a practical decision-making tool, is
welfare-maximizing, as compared to currently available competitor procedures . . . across a wide
range of governmental choice situations.” MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW
FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 62 (2006).
34. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE
L.J. 165, 175 (1999) (“[Cost-benefit analysis] is frequently hampered by a lack of data . . . .”); see
generally Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory Experimentation and
Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 114 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009)
(“Proponents of a new regulation inevitably argue that its benefits are substantial, while
opponents inevitably argue that the costs are too high. The difficulty is that the evidence needed
to assess such claims is almost always unavailable.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed
Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349 (2011) (acknowledging the importance of improving the
informational inputs into cost-benefit analysis).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
36. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Cost and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 522 (1989) (“The most obvious goal . . . of judicial review is to increase
the incidence of legality. Under this view, judicial review of administrative action is necessary
above all to ensure that regulatory agencies comply with congressional commands.”).
37. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1776 (2007) (“[T]he Court has shaped administrative law in a manner that
enables Congress—beyond the bare provisions of the APA and other statutes—to monitor agency
action.”).

412

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:2:401

agency capture,38 or provides quality control for agency decisionmaking.39
In academia, however, judicial review of agency action has as
many critics as supporters.40 One line of criticism states that judicial
ideology influences outcomes in cases reviewing agency action.41
Another claims that judicial review is neither sufficiently nor
consistently deferential to agencies.42 Either way, risk-averse agencies
have a strong incentive to only promulgate rules and risk judicial
invalidation when they can exhaustively document their justifications.
By now, the refrain should be clear: the hurdle judicial review
creates for regulation generally is particularly acute for the regulation
of emerging risks because of the information gap. Judicial review
reinforces the dual requirements of notice and comment and costbenefit analysis that agencies regulating emerging risks struggle to
meet, and it adds a further incentive to exhaustively document
information that an agency might lack. When agencies predict that they
will not satisfy these informational hurdles, they may postpone
regulating emerging risks until they acquire sufficient information.
B. Entrenchment
Postponing regulation in the face of limited information has its
benefits. A rule based on more thorough information is not simply a rule
that can survive the rulemaking process; if the informational hurdles
have any value, they should also produce a more optimal rule. But the
costs of postponing the regulation of emerging risks often outweigh its
benefits. Agencies are partially constrained by politics, and the political
economy of a regulation may change over time.
38. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug
of War over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 675 (1992) (“In order to prevent agency
capture by special interest groups, the judiciary should subject agency action to rationality review
and rigorous means-ends analysis.”).
39. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 20, at 1452 (“[J]udicial review can perform a necessary
‘quality control’ function.”).
40. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1289 (2014) (claiming that judicial review of agency action “has come under searing criticism
for undermining effective governance”).
41. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58
DUKE L.J. 2193, 2209 (2009) (“[J]udicial review of administrative action shows a strong effect from
the political inclinations of federal judges . . . [even though] . . . existing administrative law
principles are best understood as a self-conscious effort to prevent this state of affairs.”).
42. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 20, at 1419 (“Because the agencies perceive that the
reviewing courts are inconsistent in the degree to which they are deferential, they are constrained
to prepare for the worst-case scenario on judicial review. This can be extremely resource-intensive
and time-consuming.”).
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Changes in law can create path dependence: large,
unanticipated future effects from seemingly small initial changes.43
Sometimes a change in law will entrench the ability of political forces
to resist future status quo changes.44 Scholars have long noted that the
adoption of a constitutional provision or the enactment of a statute can
lead to entrenchment and prevent amendment or repeal.45 Inaction, just
as much as action, can also lead to entrenchment. A failure to pass
legislation or regulation during a critical political window can entrench
a lightly regulated status quo.46
Failing to regulate emerging risks at an early stage can cause
two types of entrenchment: interest group entrenchment and social
norm entrenchment. Preventing interest group entrenchment often
justifies early regulation of emerging risks. Preventing social norm
entrenchment is more normatively problematic, but it still may justify
early regulation in a limited set of cases.

43. For a rigorous analysis of the multiple meanings of “path dependence” as applied to law,
see Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in
a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 606–23 (2001).
44. For a similar analysis using the phrase “lock-in” instead of entrenchment, see generally
Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998).
45. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem,
85 GEO. L.J. 491, 502–09 (1997) (defining “legislative” and “cross-temporal” entrenchment).
Private law can be a source of entrenchment as well; Daryl J. Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs,
Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 124 YALE L.J. 400, 454–56 (2015) (arguing that informal
entrenchment may result from measures that strengthen allies, weaken opponents, change
composition of a political community, or change decisionmaking processes); John O. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA.
L. REV. 385, 388–89 (2003) (arguing that formal constitutional and legislative entrenchment in the
United States is generally forbidden and undesirable); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Essay,
Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1666 (2002) (arguing that a
constitutional rule barring formal entrenchment should be eliminated); John C. Roberts & Erwin
Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule,
91 CAL. L. REV. 1773, 1775 (2003) (using the death penalty and abortion to explain the concept of
entrenchment); see generally Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment through Private Law:
Binding Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879 (2011).
46. The entrenchment problem and the importance of the pre-entrenchment political window
have been acknowledged in the emerging technologies literature. See, e.g., Albert C. Lin,
Revamping Our Approach to Emerging Technologies, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1309 (2011) (“[N]ew
technologies also raise the specter of adverse health effects, environmental degradation and
disaster, and even dehumanization, should those technologies go awry. . . . Addressing these
problems becomes especially difficult when technological systems become entrenched.”); Thomas
O. McGarity & Karl O. Bayer, Federal Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 VAND. L.
REV. 461, 478–79 (1983) (“Experience with other potentially dangerous technologies, however,
repeatedly has demonstrated the value of assessing the risks to man and the environment before
the technologies attain widespread use.”).
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1. Interest Group Entrenchment
Interest group influence pervades risk regulation. Interest
group theory predicts that, in legislative and regulatory processes, the
interests of small, concentrated groups will prevail over the interests of
a diffuse public.47 Concentrated interest groups are better able to solve
collective action problems than larger groups because each individual
member of those groups has a higher per capita stake in the group effort
and the group can more easily police free riding.48 When interest groups
become repeat players, they augment these advantages by acquiring
strategic knowledge and the will to sacrifice short-term losses for longterm goals.49
Many of the statutes and rules that regulate risks to health,
safety, and the environment confer benefits on a diffuse public—
including future generations, foreigners, and nonhuman animals—and
costs on concentrated, repeat-player interest groups, especially riskcreating firms and their trade associations. For these reasons, the
political viability of risk regulation statutes or rules can depend
considerably on the interest group power of such regulated firms.50
Emerging risks can bring with them a brief political window in
which concentrated interest groups may not have yet entrenched
themselves. This can happen for several reasons. The firms may be
start-ups lacking any lobbying relationships. Even if some firms in the
industry have retained lobbyists, the firms may have not yet organized
together into a trade association that can police free riding. Even if a
trade association has been organized, it might not have developed
relationships with powerful officials or gained the requisite experience
for repeat-player advantages.
Interest groups can become entrenched while agencies wait to
acquire information before regulating. The firms that would be
47. E.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 144 (20th prtg. 2002). For a
critique of these arguments, see generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
48. See OLSON, supra note 47, at 44.
49. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (arguing that organized and influential
groups have adapted to benefit from pre-existing rules).
50. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 128 (1998) (“[L]arge regulated parties enjoy much greater presence
in agency decisionmaking processes than do public interest groups and other outside parties.”);
Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51
ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 464 (1999) (“[W]ithin niches of an agency's policy domain, firms in regulated
industries and interest groups with strong central staffs still occupy a favored position in
regulatory and political structures that allows them an advantage in influencing agency
decisions.”).
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regulated may grow, and the industry may organize. In some cases, the
industry may expand employment, which gives a wider swath of the
public a stake in the continuation of the risky technology. If agencies
subsequently discover a strong case for aggressive regulation, newly
entrenched risk-creating firms may be able to block forthcoming
statutes or rules.51 For this reason, industry has a strong incentive to
delay regulation, and existing administrative law gives them tools to
pressure agencies to do so.
2. Social Norm Entrenchment
Social norm entrenchment is subtler. It occurs when some new
risky technology gains sufficient widespread public acceptance that new
regulation or legislation restricting it would fail even without interest
group influence.52 Imagine, for example, that mobile phones really did
significantly increase the risk of cancer.53 In the early 1990s, only a
small percentage of the population of the United States used mobile
phones,54 so it likely would have been politically possible to restrict
them. If new evidence accumulated suggesting that mobile phones
caused cancer today, it is not inconceivable that some regulation would
still be politically viable. Perhaps the spread of texting has made voice
calls less necessary or perhaps Bluetooth devices could be mandated.
But there is no doubt that the widespread use of mobile phones would
make
regulation
more
difficult
to
achieve.
Entrenched
51. Eugene Volokh calls this a “political power slippery slope.” Eugene Volokh, The
Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1114 (2003). He explains: “Decision A
may thus change the balance of political power by empowering an interest group that might use
this power to promote B; getting to A first and then to B would thus be politically easier than
getting to B directly (though of course still not certain).” Id. at 1115. Note that in all of Volokh’s
examples, he is concerned with government action, rather than a decision not to regulate. But
there is no obvious reason why, for some of his examples, a similar argument could not be made
for the latter.
52. For similar arguments, see Gillette, supra note 44, at 832–41, analyzing the lock-in
effects of norms, and Volokh, supra note 51, 1077–105, analyzing “attitude-altering slippery
slopes.”
53. According to the National Institutes of Health, “[T]o date there is no evidence from
studies of cells, animals, or humans that radiofrequency energy can cause cancer.” Cell Phones
and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH (June 24, 2013),
http://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/risk/radiation/cell-phones-fact-sheet
[http://perma.cc/HM2M-4M7K]
54. According to one wireless industry survey, there were an estimated 5,283,055 wireless
subscribers in 1990, 7,557,148 in 1991, and 11,032,753 in 1992. See CTIA’s Annual Survey Says
US Wireless Providers Handled 3.2 Trillion Megabytes of Data Traffic in 2013 for a 120 Percent
Increase over 2012, CTIA (June 17, 2014), http://www.ctia.org/resource-library/pressreleases/archive/ctia-annual-survey-2013 [perma.cc/P4D5-6F6Y]; Background on CTIA’s Wireless
Industry Survey, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/Facts-Stats/ctia_survey_ye_2014_
graphics.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (last visited Oct. 19, 2015) [http://perma.cc/F8QG-AX54].
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telecommunications firms might lobby against regulation, or dispute
whatever scientific evidence supported the cancer link, as the tobacco
firms did for decades. But there would likely be public opposition even
in the absence of industry lobbying—that is social norm
entrenchment.55
The case for taking early action to prevent interest group
entrenchment is straightforward. If interest group power will constrain
a democratically legitimate and justified regulatory solution in the
future, it is likely worth such early action to preserve that option.56 The
normative case for preventing social norm entrenchment is more
complicated. Even if a regulation is otherwise justified, the fact that a
democratic majority opposes it is at least plausibly a reason to reject it.
Any argument about limiting the ability of future popular majorities to
govern their own fate is problematic. At a minimum, whether it is
legitimate for the state to act so as to influence majority opinion is an
open normative question. As one constitutional law scholar has argued,
“Actions that are later in time presumably more accurately track the
current desires of those who will actually be affected by those actions
and who, therefore, have the stronger claim to legitimate input into the
decisionmaking process.”57
There are, however, at least three plausible scenarios in which
social norm entrenchment might reflect something other than genuine
disagreement about values. If any of these arguments apply for a
particular emerging risk, agencies might be justified in using the
moratorium power to prevent social norms surrounding that risk from
becoming entrenched.
First, consider the unusual case of reverse social norm
entrenchment—the possibility that some event will cause the public to
oppose the introduction of an emerging technology for which the
benefits outweigh the risks. For example, consider the early days of
55. Volokh argues that the public can be misled by the “is-ought fallacy”:
[People] erroneously assume [ ] that just because the law allows some government
action . . . actions of that sort must be proper. If this error is common, then one might
generally worry that the government's implementing decision A will indeed lead people
to fallaciously assume that A is right, which will then make it easier to implement B.
Volokh, supra note 51, at 1079. This Article’s argument is the mirror image of Volokh’s: the public
will assume that just become some risky activity is legal and widely practiced, it must be
innocuous.
56. Volokh defends this type of reasoning by taking the perspective of a voter rather than a
society: “This approach might at first seem improperly paternalistic or anti-majoritarian, but it
simply reflects political reality. . . . So if we do think that implementing A would lead others to
support B while we ourselves would continue to oppose B, that's a reason for us to oppose A.” Id.
at 1104.
57. Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1592
(1988).
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passenger air travel, in which the public was fearful about the new
technology.58 It is conceivable that some early crash might have created
popular momentum favoring restriction of the technology, even though
its benefits outweighed its risks, possibly at that time and most
certainly in the future.
Cognitive science has demonstrated that we process information
using the availability heuristic—“estimating the probability of an event
on the basis of how easily instances of it can be brought to mind.”59 We
also will estimate the probability of a risk to be higher if the risk is
particularly salient or vivid.60 When many individuals in a group
overestimate the likelihood of a risk because of the availability
heuristic, these “individual uses of the availability heuristic increase
the public availability of data pointing to a particular interpretation or
conclusion, and this increase in availability then triggers reinforcing
individual responses,” resulting in an availability cascade.61
Availability cascades may have, for example, caused the
disproportionate public reaction to vivid, high profile examples of
health, safety, and environmental harm like the outrage over the Love
Canal toxic waste site, the Alar pesticide scare, and airplane crashes.62
A moratorium or other early limitations on an emerging
technology could prevent an early, vivid, but unrepresentative
manifestation of its risk that could lead to an availability cascade and
overly restrictive permanent regulation. Market incentives may not be
sufficient because, even if the median risk-creating firm in an industry
is sufficiently cautious to avoid an early incident, the least cautious firm
can still create a problem for the whole industry. This unconventional
sort of market failure justifies action against reverse social norm
entrenchment.
Second, scholars have long recognized that many risky activities
have a social meaning.63 Our perceptions of risk and our beliefs about
how to regulate them are influenced by “cultural cognition,” defined as
58. Elaine Iljon Foreman et al., Flight or Fright? Psychological Approaches to the Treatment
of Fear of Flying, in AVIATION MENTAL HEALTH: PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR AIR TRAVEL
70 (Tony Hubbard & Robert Bor eds., 2006).
59. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 683, 706 (1999).
60. See id. at 707.
61. Id. at 712.
62. See id. at 691–703. Kuran and Sunstein’s examples are drawn from AARON B.
WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE? A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES
(1995).
63. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 963–71
(1995) (describing the social meaning of wearing motorcycle helmets in the Soviet Union, wearing
helmets in hockey, and dueling).
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“the psychological disposition of persons to conform their factual beliefs
about the instrumental efficacy (or perversity) of law to their cultural
evaluations of the activities subject to regulation.”64 Risk perceptions of
guns, smoking, nuclear power, and climate change all exhibit the effects
of cultural cognition.65 If, for example, one identifies with hierarchical
or individualistic cultural groups, one is likely to be skeptical about
climate change.66 Alternatively, if one identifies with egalitarian or
communitarian cultural groups, one is more apt to believe that nuclear
power poses significant risks.67
Cultural cognition might raise a special problem for perceptions
of emerging risks. One recent study examined the effects of cultural
cognition on the perception of nanotechnology’s risks and benefits.68 In
the study, one group of participants was “told nothing about
nanotechnology other than it is a scientific process for producing and
manipulating very small particles.”69 When participants in that group
were asked whether the benefits of nanotechnology were greater than
its risks, there was no divergence in answer based on cultural
worldview.70 Another group was given a two-paragraph explanation of
nanotechnology’s risks and benefits.71 In that informed group, the
respondents displayed widely different perceptions of risk depending on
their cultural worldview: 86% of hierarchical individualists said the
benefits were greater than its risks, but only 23% of egalitarian or
communitarians said so.72
If the results of the nanotechnology study are generalizable, it
suggests that being exposed to information about an emerging risk
might alter opinions about the risks and benefits of that technology
through the process of cultural cognition. It is possible that risky
technologies might have a “cultural cognition window.” At the
beginning of the window, the risky activity might have no particular
social meaning. But as certain social groups begin to participate in the
activity or as it becomes otherwise associated with a specific cultural
identity, perceptions about the risk and views about whether and how

64. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 149, 151–52 (2006).
65. See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 134–42 (2007).
66. Id. at 140–41.
67. See id. at 139–40.
68. See generally Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural cognition of the risks and benefits of
nanotechnology, 4 NATURE NANOTECH. 87 (2009).
69. Id. at 87.
70. Id. at 87–88.
71. Id. at 87.
72. Id. at 88.
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it ought to be regulated calcify. This polarization leads to political
obstacles to justified regulation—social norm entrenchment. A
moratorium, by preventing any social group from participating in a new
risky activity, delays the process by which the technology would acquire
a cultural meaning and reduces the possibility that future debates
about how to regulate it became entangled in cultural cognition.
Third, future majorities might oppose regulation temporarily
because of cognitive dissonance—the psychological process that causes
us to discount new evidence that would show our earlier choices to have
been mistaken.73 Consider again the case of mobile phones and cancer.
Mobile phones have become so interwoven into our lives that cognitive
dissonance might be a powerful force resisting new regulation, should
evidence accumulate that they are sufficiently carcinogenic to be
banned. A moratorium on mobile phones—or at least on mobile phones
that are held close to the brain—might have allowed us to precommit
ourselves against the predictable effects of cognitive dissonance.74 The
argument would be especially strong if the social norm entrenchment
was temporary—that is, if cognitive dissonance merely delayed our
acceptance of the evidence justifying the ban.
These examples suggest that preventing social norm
entrenchment will be justified in some limited cases when the change
in social norms will predictably impair future decisionmaking.
Preventing interest group entrenchment is justified in a wider set of
cases. Existing administrative law creates the risk of entrenchment and
thereby often prevents effective regulation of emerging risks.
II. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR REGULATING EMERGING RISKS
Scholars have offered three alternative models for regulating
under conditions of factual uncertainty, which I call the Precautionary,
Common Law, and Laboratory of Democracy models. These models
were not specifically designed for the problem of emerging risks. They
are, undoubtedly, motivated by deeper ideological commitments about
73. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L. 887, 914 (1994)
(“Another form of cognitive dissonance also biases public risk perceptions. People are closely
wedded to their current set of beliefs and relatively unwilling to change their beliefs, regardless of
the strength of contrary evidence. Pre-existing opinions, even those arbitrarily held, overwhelm
even reliable contradictory evidence . . . .”).
74. In addition to the general objection to any precommitment argument that the future
agent will have a more legitimate claim to decide for itself, there is the additional objection that
groups, which will not all agree with the precommitment, are relevantly different than individuals,
who at least have some claim to be acting for their future selves. For an objection along those lines,
see Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities
of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1757–61 (2003).
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the proper role of the administrative state. But because each of these
models responds to the problem of factual uncertainty, they have come
to frame the scholarly debate about how to regulate emerging risks. I
argue that the Precautionary, Common Law, and Laboratory of
Democracy models ultimately offer unsatisfactory solutions to the
problem of regulating emerging risks. Identifying the strengths and
weaknesses of these models will clarify the need for the Experimentalist
model that Part III introduces.
A. Precautionary
The manifesto of the Precautionary model is the Precautionary
Principle. It states, in one famous formulation, that, “[w]hen an activity
raises threats of harm to human health or the environment,
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect
relationships are not fully established scientifically.”75 How the
Precautionary Principle should be operationalized is not immediately
obvious, in part because its advocates support it for various reasons.76
Some defenders of the Precautionary model appeal directly to
deontological moral intuitions, relying on a distinction between doing
and allowing harm or otherwise emphasizing the collective moral
agency of the community.77 Others offer the related but distinct
argument that regulating through cost-benefit analysis requires
“putting a price on human life,” which they contend is intrinsically
wrong.78 Even if human death and suffering could be quantified, some
argue, it is immoral to weigh those costs against economic benefits.79
75. The Wingspread Consensus Statement on the Precautionary Principle, SCIENCE & ENVTL.
HEALTH NETWORK (Jan. 1998), http://www.sehn.org/wing.html [http://perma.cc/R36P-HR6C].
Another leading statement is the Rio Declaration, which states: “Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” U.N. Conference on Environment
and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. DOC.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/
aconf15126-1annex1.htm [http://perma.cc/GKF3-3V32].
76. See John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY
ENVT’L. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 17 (identifying as a principal criticism of the Precautionary Principle
that “[t]here are many versions of it and none gives explicit direction for individual cases,” but
contending that “it is perfectly possible to make sense out of the numerous formulations of the
[P]recautionary [P]rinciple by breaking it down into elements and charting the variation within
those elements”).
77. E.g., KYSAR, supra note 5, at 46–67.
78. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 5, at 8 (“[H]uman life, health, and
nature cannot be described meaningfully in monetary terms; they are priceless.”); Steven Kelman,
Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, REG. AM. ENTERPRISE INST. J. ON GOV’T & SOC’Y, Jan.–
Feb. 1981 at 33, 38 (“[S]ome things . . . are priceless . . . such as life or health.”).
79. E.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 5, at 61–90.
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In addition to the moral case for the Precautionary model, some
scholars argue that there are empirical reasons to take a precautionary
approach. They point to the complexity of natural systems and the
inherent uncertainty of scientific predictions about how the natural
environment will respond to changes.80 Some risks, they contend,
involve the possibility of irreversible damage.81 Other risks are
catastrophic, on such a scale that any non-precautionary approach
would be disastrous.82
With the diversity of arguments supporting the Precautionary
model, it is unsurprising that there is no consensus on how to
operationalize it. What action does the Precautionary Principle require
when a technology, like nuclear power, both causes and mitigates risks
to the environment or when a new technology, like genetically modified
foods, has the potential to both benefit and harm human health? Critics
of the Precautionary Principle argue that the Principle is indeterminate
in these risk-risk tradeoff scenarios, in which regulators cannot simply
choose the course of action that avoids all health or environmental
costs.83
Some precautionary thinkers have responded that risk-risk
tradeoffs are rare—most regulatory decisions involve a tradeoff
between economic costs and risks to health, safety, or the
environment.84 Regardless of whether that claim is true in general, it is
false for the emerging risks considered here. Fracking creates multiple
environmental risks, but, by shifting energy production from coal to
natural gas, it reduces the climate risks of carbon emissions.85 Ecigarettes might be a net positive for public health, if—and this is a big
if—they help smokers quit and do not addict nonsmokers. Autonomous
vehicles have the potential to cut traffic fatalities down to a fraction of
current numbers.86 At least for these emerging risks, the argument that
some versions of the Precautionary Principle are indeterminate in riskrisk situations cannot be dismissed.
80. E.g., KYSAR, supra note 5, at 71–90.
81. See, e.g., id. at 90–98 (arguing that cost-benefit analysis in environmental contexts often
cannot and should not provide a quantitative estimate of consequences).
82. E.g., id.
83. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 26–
34 (2005) (arguing that the precautionary principle is paralyzing if taken at face value); Frank B.
Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851, 859–60
(arguing that even actions aimed at reducing harm carry some risk of causing harm) (1996).
84. See Steffen Foss Hansen & Joel A. Tickner, Putting Risk-Risk Tradeoffs in Perspective:
A Response to Graham and Wiener, 11 J. RISK RES. 475, 476 (2008) (discussing the examples of
mercury in fish and tropospheric ozone).
85. See infra Part IV.
86. See id.
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Of course, the state could ban all new and potentially risky
technologies, but this radical version drains some of the intuitive appeal
of the Precautionary Principle.87 What intuitive appeal it retains might
be influenced by loss aversion.88 A society that faithfully implemented
that kind of Precautionary Principle might be a society without
antibiotics, air travel, or mobile phones.89 The pervasiveness of
scientific uncertainty, especially with respect to emerging risks, can cut
both ways. Foreclosing all innovation precludes the possibility of
learning that some risks might be more innocuous than they initially
appeared.
Even for regulatory decisions that do not involve risk-risk
tradeoffs, it is difficult to defend total insensitivity to disproportionate
economic costs or benefits. Some have argued that economic costs
translate into health costs because “wealth leads to health,”90 but one
need not accept that view to agree that economic costs can cause
significant suffering, especially when the distributional effect falls on
the least well-off. These and other conceptual difficulties with simple
interpretations of the Precautionary Principle have led to proposals for
its refinement, some of which are compatible with considering economic
costs and benefits.91
Despite the Precautionary model’s shortcomings, precautionary
thinking does offer important insights for regulating emerging risks. In
particular, its caution about scientific uncertainty raises doubt about
the advisability of early cost-benefit analyses and counsels in favor of
early research into risky emerging technologies. Although risks to
health, safety, or the environment are rarely literally irreversible, it is
critical to consider the difficulty of reversing such regulation after
entrenchment has occurred.
The Experimentalist model offers a distinct alternative to some
implementations of the Precautionary model, but it could also be

87. For a summary of other responses to the risk-risk tradeoff objection to the Precautionary
Principle, see Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from Its Critics, 2011
U. ILL. L. REV. 1285, 1316–17 (2011).
88. SUNSTEIN, supra note 83, at 35–63.
89. For a similar argument, see id. at 25.
90. For a qualified defense of that view, see generally, Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health
Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996).
91. See, e.g., Stephen Charest, Bayesian Approaches to the Precautionary Principle, 12 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 265, 272–277 (2002) (advocating a Bayesian approach to risk analysis); Daniel
A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 936–44 (2011) (weighing scientific and economic
uncertainties for the example of climate change mitigation); Mark Geistfeld, Implementing the
Precautionary Principle, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11326, 11328–32 (2001) (suggesting that the
precautionary principle and cost-benefit analysis are not incompatible).
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considered a more nuanced way of implementing the precautionary
vision for the regulation of emerging risks.92
B. Common Law
The Precautionary model’s mirror image is the Common Law
model. In its purest form, the Common Law model would leave those
injured by a new risky technology to their common law remedies. The
more commonly defended form of the Common Law model is a
temporary one, in which the market is allowed to innovate with new
risky technologies until agencies develop information that indicates
that regulation is warranted. But if firms are able to thwart regulation,
the temporary Common Law model can collapse into the permanent
Common Law model.
Some scholars have defended the permanent Common Law
model for risk regulation.93 The absence of regulation would allow for
unlimited market innovation, but it would come at a crippling cost to
those on whom the risk would fall. Common Law enthusiasts argue that
the ex post penalties of tort law can provide some ex ante deterrence
and protection from risk, but there are several well-established
limitations on this deterrent effect.
First, because of causation, standing, evidential, and incentive
problems, tort law is generally ineffective at reducing certain types of
environmental or health risks. These include risks dispersed across a
broad public,94 risks that are caused by diffuse sources,95 and risks that
92. For a distinct, but related, argument about how to reconcile cost-benefit analysis with
the Precautionary Principle, see generally Driesen, supra note 32.
93. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 6 (arguing that “common law rules should be the
presumptively optimal method of controlling local environmental harms”); Meiners & Yandle,
supra note 6 (arguing that “the common law, aided by state-level controls, could have done much
of the job needed to protect the environment”).
94. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Lost in the Translation: What Environmental Regulation
Does that Tort Cannot Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 601 (2002) (explaining that in cases
“where harm falls broadly on a large group and any individual harm does not rise above a threshold
necessary to constitute an actionable injury . . . the sources of the harm may be causing harm that
in the aggregate justifies intervention, but no one will be able to litigate.”).
95. See id. (explaining that cases involving “concentrated effects from diffuse origins, present
different doctrinal problems, especially ones having to do with the cause-in-fact requirement” and
noting that joint and several liability is not always an answer because “the range of cases to which
joint and several liability applies is under continual pressure from defendants claiming it to be
unfair.”). Schroeder emphasizes the special problem of tort claims that combine dispersed harms
and diffuse origins. See id. at 601–02. For a similar argument, see Adam D.K. Abelkop, Tort Law
as an Environmental Policy Instrument, 92 OR. L. REV. 381, 385 (surveying the limits of tort law
regulation of environmental risks and concluding that “in most circumstances, tort law will not
function efficiently and effectively as a lone policy instrument; but nonetheless, it serves important
functions as a complement to regulatory rules.”).
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are latent for decades,96 let alone risks to future generations, nonhuman
animals, or the natural environment.
Second, emerging risks are especially ill-suited to tort law
because tort claims are generally limited to injuries that were or should
have been foreseeable to defendants.97 The potential injuries that
emerging risks might cause are, by definition, clouded by scientific
uncertainty, so tortfeasors will have at least a potentially successful
defense in arguing they were unforeseeable.
Third, tort defendants in emerging risk cases may be judgment98
proof. Firms innovating with new risky technologies are more likely
to be start-ups than established incumbents. If the risky technology
turns out to cause significant injuries, the market for the firm’s product
may evaporate and the firm may be bankrupt by the time that all
injured plaintiffs are able to sue.
Fourth, relatedly, the solvency of defendants in the tort system
relies on insurance coverage, and insurers are unlikely to cover
emerging risks.99 Insurers will only cover risks that they can classify
with some confidence.100 The claims that will be paid out for emerging
risks will depend on factual predictions about the likelihood and
magnitude of injuries that would be unknown at the time of
underwriting. In addition, if the firms innovating with new risky
technologies are small start-ups, they will likely be unable to selfinsure.

96. See Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78
S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1446 (2005) (explaining that, with latent harms, the “passage of time not
only complicates proof, but also increases the risk that a defendant will no longer be financially
viable, assuming that the defendant can even be identified. Compounding plaintiffs' difficulties,
statutes of limitations may bar suit . . . .”).
97. See David G. Owen, Bending Nature, Bending Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 569, 588–605 (2010)
(explaining that, despite some doctrinal innovations in the 1960s and 1970s, the foreseeability
requirement continues to limit tort liability for injuries caused by what were emerging risks at the
time of the tortious act).
98. See, e.g., Maksim Rakhlin, Regulating Nanotechnology: A Private-Public Insurance
Solution, 2008 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2 (2008) (discussing the judgment-proof problem in the
context of nanotechnology risks and noting that many nanotechnology companies are start-ups).
99. For an example in the context of nanotechnology, see id. at 32 (“[S]parse exposure and
toxicology research, a lack of nano-related accident history, and the breadth of nanotechnology
applications leave insurers without reasonable means to classify the risk posed by
nanomaterials.”).
100. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 942, 946–47 (1988) (“When faced with excessive uncertainty regarding . . .
probabilities, an insurer . . . cannot estimate its probable success in diversifying risk through
pooling, and . . . cannot determine the correct price to charge for its risk-bearing services.”).
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These theoretical limitations on the ability of tort law to regulate
risks are predictable.101 In the case of environmental risks, there is
“[e]mpirical evidence suggest[ing] that environmental torts suits
currently send a weak deterrent signal.”102
The more sophisticated defense of the Common Law model
argues not that the state should abandon public regulation altogether,
but that it should wait until market innovation has produced enough
information that the state can regulate effectively.103 The temporary
Common Law model is the tacit position of those who support the status
quo, in which agencies wait to acquire information about emerging risks
before regulating.
All of the criticisms of the permanent Common Law model apply
to the temporary Common Law model until the eventual regulation can
happen. But there are two additional problems with the temporary
Common Law model. Its passive mechanism for acquiring information
diminishes the quality of regulation and its waiting period allows
regulatory entrenchment.
Market innovation may not produce information useful for
regulation for three reasons. First, much of the information relevant to
regulation—what pollutants are being emitted, what carcinogens are in
the byproducts, who might be exposed, what symptoms are being
observed—may be held by risk-creating firms or entities.104 Second,
because risk-creating firms have an interest in influencing public
perceptions about the risks of their activities, they have the incentive
to conceal unfavorable information about those risks, selectively reveal
more favorable information, or at least prolong uncertainty to the
extent it serves their regulatory interests. Third, even if market
innovation does reveal some information about the risk, the
uncontrolled market action lacks even the most rudimentary controls
101. The tort system may still serve an important purpose for risk regulation: providing
information that agencies can use in public law regulation. See Wendy Wagner, When All Else
Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 695 (2007) (“[T]he tort
system can be more effective than the regulatory system in accessing the various types of
information needed to inform regulatory decisions.”).
102. Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (1993).
103. To be clear, my claim is not that scholars have defended the temporary Common Law
model. I contend that it is the implication of supporting a Cost-Benefit model that allows agencies
to wait to regulate until they have received sufficient information to conduct a meaningful
analysis. Jonathan Adler comes closest to explicitly embracing that position. See Jonathan H.
Adler, More Sorry than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary Principle and the Proposed International
Biosafety Protocol, 35 TEX. INT’L L.J. 173, 205 (2000) (arguing for shifting the burden to the state
to provide sufficient evidence of harm before regulating).
104. For examples and a more detailed theoretical account of why firms have little incentive
to make public information that could be relevant to regulation public, see Wagner, supra note 32,
at 1625–59.
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of experimentation, so inferring causal effects may be exceedingly
difficult.
The net effect of relying on interested, uncoordinated outside
parties to voluntarily produce information for regulation is that
agencies may be late to act when emerging risks justify aggressive
regulation and will be less informed when they do act. Moreover, even
if market innovation does provide some information about the costs and
benefits of a risky technology, it may not provide information about the
potential means to mitigate the risk. Because regulatory agencies take
a passive role in the Common Law model, they will be less prepared to
evaluate competing strategies for regulation when they acquire
sufficient information about the risk to regulate.
Finally and most importantly, the Common Law model may lead
to entrenchment. Firms opposed to regulation may grow and organize
into effective interest groups that can thwart regulation. Social norms
can develop during the period of market innovation that later impede
effective decisionmaking. Of course, to some proponents of the Common
Law model, entrenchment is a feature, not a flaw. But, if and when
regulation is justified, entrenchment can turn the temporary Common
Law model into a permanent Common Law regime and prevent
effective regulation.
C. Laboratory of Democracy
Justice Brandeis wrote that “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”105 The Laboratory
of Democracy model thereby serves as the legal baseline for regulating
emerging risks in the United States because, in the absence of federal
legislation preempting state laws, the states are free to innovate with
different regulatory regimes.106 Unlike market innovation, which can at
best only produce information about the costs and benefits of a risky
technology, policy innovation can provide information about regulatory
options as well.107 In the context of emerging risks, the hope is that
105. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
106. But see William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1560 (2007) (“In our post-New Deal era, most
areas of law traditionally dominated by state and local choice include at least limited federal
involvement.”).
107. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 7, at 287 (“The private sector institutions of learning
by monitoring suggest a public sector model of problem solving adapted to a polity . . . . The model
requires linked systems of local and inter-local or federal pooling of information . . . so that actors
scrutinize their initial understandings of problems and feasible solutions.”); see also Yair Listokin,
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states will simultaneously test out the plausible regulatory
alternatives, and federal regulators can then select the approach with
the best benefit-cost ratio.108
The Laboratory of Democracy model has considerable appeal.
Although the federal government can experiment with multiple
regulatory alternatives, one might think the states are more likely to
exhaust the plausible regulatory options because each state
“experiment” will be designed by a different decision-maker.109 Because
the states are ideologically heterogeneous, there might be political will
for certain policy innovations in some states that is lacking at the
federal level. The optimal regulatory regime may vary from state to
state because local conditions differ, and state governments and their
electorates will be more familiar with those idiosyncratic conditions.110
There is, however, a counterintuitive strain in the federalism
literature which argues that states innovate at a less-than-sociallyefficient level.111 The argument is that state and local innovation face a
collective action problem. Because politicians in one jurisdiction can
free ride on the experience of other jurisdictions, they have little
individual incentive to innovate.112 While these arguments may be
plausible a priori, at least the brief histories of the three emerging risks
analyzed below demonstrate that state and local governments
sometimes do innovate, even if not at the socially efficient level.113

Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 514 (2008) (“Other jurisdictions can
costlessly observe the outcomes of these high-variance/high-expected-value policies and adopt the
policies if they are successful while avoiding their negative effects if they are failures.”).
108. See Listokin, supra note 107, at 483 (“If the policy succeeds, then policymakers will have
achieved an ideal outcome and will no longer need to search for alternatives.”). But see Orly Lobel,
The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 380 (2004) (“The most sophisticated articulations of the governance
model, however, understand competition and diversity not as a temporary strategy before choosing
the superior solution . . . but rather as a means for continuous change and improvement.”).
109. See, e.g., Listokin, supra note 107, at 513 (“[L]ocalities will naturally experiment because
different populations will have different policy goals. In other words, different jurisdictions will
pursue new policies because the new policies have higher expected value for that particular
jurisdiction than do existing policies . . . .”).
110. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 7, at 317 (“[C]itizen users have unique knowledge of
those particulars of their own, local circumstances that must be taken into account[;] . . . those
exposed to potential side effects are likely to have the sharpest eye for threats to their well-being.”).
111. The origin of these arguments is Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection:
Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980). See also Brian Galle & Joseph
Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY
L.J. 1333, 1334 (2009) (reviewing responses to Rose-Ackerman’s claims and concluding that “there
are no demonstrably overwhelming replies”).
112. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 111, at 594.
113. For more on state responses to fracking, e-cigarettes, and autonomous vehicles, see infra
Part IV.
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The stronger criticism of the Laboratory of Democracy model is
that when states do innovate, those innovations will not be reliable
experiments. The worst-case scenario for state innovation is the socalled “race to the bottom.”114 The premise behind the race-to-thebottom argument, as applied to risk regulation, is that risky activities
are mobile.115 Consequently, in the absence of any federal preemptive
legislation, risk-creating firms will seek to move operations to the state
or locality that will provide them with the least restrictive regulatory
regime. The firms may be able to acquire this regime through sheer
interest group power, such as by making campaign contributions to
legislators. State and local legislators might also believe that attracting
the risky activity is in their constituents’ interests, if moving operations
to the state will increase tax revenue or provide employment
opportunities.116 What makes this process a “race” is that firms can pit
states or localities against one another competitively and move to the
jurisdiction with the most attractive bid. The firms might not even need
to direct the bidding war themselves; states will anticipate the race to
the bottom and strategize accordingly.117
One possible result of a race to the bottom is a Common Law
regime of the worst kind: the risky activity will migrate to a jurisdiction
with a weak, nonexistent, or captured regulatory infrastructure. This
jurisdiction may have a weak tax base, suffer from high unemployment,
or be ideologically opposed to aggressive risk regulation. If these
conditions are present, the regulatory regime imposed by that state or

114. The literature is voluminous and contentious. The recent debate started with Richard L.
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992). For leading critiques, see
generally Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There A “Race” and Is It “To
the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental
Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996). For a reply, see generally Richard L. Revesz, The Race
to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535
(1997).
115. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212
(1977) (“Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state or community may
rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards that entail substantial costs
for industry . . . for fear that the resulting environmental gains will be more than offset by
movement of capital to other areas with lower standards.”).
116. See Esty, supra note 114, at 603–04 (“Regulators and the politicians who appoint them
perceive that by cutting environmental standards and stealing a march on other jurisdictions in
the competition for new investment, jobs, and industrial activity, they will increase their
constituents’ welfare by more than the utility losses inflicted by whatever environmental
degradation occurs.”).
117. See id. at 604 (“The knowledge that one's competitors intend to lower or already have
lowered environmental standards induces parties to act preemptively or responsively and to lower
their own standards, triggering a downward regulatory spiral and nonoptimal results.”).
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locality might be less like an experiment to determine the optimal policy
and more like a front for the interests of the risk-creating firms.118 Of
course, if initial expectations of some risk turn out to be too high or
expectations of the associated benefits are too low, the jurisdiction at
the bottom may have chosen the optimal policy. The right conclusion to
draw from the race-to-the-bottom argument is that we have no reason
to assume that the policy adopted by the state that wins the race-to-thebottom is the optimal one.
But even if a race to the bottom does not take place and states
and localities innovate policy by choice rather than pressure from firms,
the Laboratory of Democracy model has a more basic flaw:
decentralized innovation is not an “experiment” in a rigorous sense.119
As one scholar put it, “ ‘Innovation’ might have been a better word
choice for Justice Brandeis than ‘experimentation,’ saving us all a lot of
bother.”120
The information federal regulators can glean from these
innovations will be far less informative than what they can achieve
through deliberate regulatory experiments. As with market innovation,
the regulatory innovations that the Laboratory of Democracy model
makes possible will not be randomized or even subject to weaker
controls, so regulators hoping to learn from them will face difficulties in
disentangling causation.121 Selection effects may cloud the results
because which jurisdictions choose which regulatory interventions may
be correlated with other facts about those jurisdictions that could be
relevant to the health or environmental outcomes observed.
The Laboratory of Democracy model also allows for interest
group and social norm entrenchment, at least in jurisdictions that do
not rapidly adopt precautionary regulation. Mobile risk-creating firms
are on the fortunate side of a power asymmetry: they only need to
prevail in one jurisdiction to continue their operations and build up a

118. But see generally Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public
Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001) (arguing that it is not clear whether the interest
group power of regulated firms would be worse at the federal or state level).
119. In theory, a centralized federal government could conduct experiments by randomly
assigning certain policies to certain states or localities, but this type of experiment would deprive
sub-federal polities of what supposedly makes federalism attractive: the ability to choose. See
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 903, 925 (1994) (“To experiment with different approaches for achieving a single, agreedupon goal, one sub-unit must be assigned an option that initially seems less desirable . . . . Allowed
to choose their own strategies, as they are in a decentralized system, no sub-units would choose
these unappealing options . . . .”).
120. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 399 (1997).
121. See infra Section III.B (explaining randomization).
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power base before expanding to other locales, but must lose in all
jurisdictions in order to be restrained.
For these reasons, at best, the state and local policy innovations
that the Laboratory of Democracy model permits are inferior to
deliberate federal regulatory experiments. At worst, when a vicious race
to the bottom occurs, the Laboratory of Democracy model collapses into
the Common Law model and exhibits all of its problems.
III. AN EXPERIMENTALIST MODEL
Part II lodged two criticisms at the existing models for
regulating emerging risks. First, they do not generate the information
needed for regulation rapidly and reliably. Second, they make future
regulation more difficult, either by cutting off innovation (the
Precautionary model) or allowing entrenchment (the Common Law and
Laboratory of Democracy models).
This Part proposes an Experimentalist model for regulating
emerging risks that addresses both of these problems. Its answer to the
information generation problem is to empower regulatory agencies to
organize randomized experiments with new risky technologies. Its
answer to the entrenchment problem is to empower agencies to impose
moratoria or other limits on the risky technologies outside of the
experimental conditions. The effect would be to expedite the acquisition
of reliable information while preserving all regulatory options.
An agency would respond to emerging risks in four steps. First,
the agency would initiate its new powers by demonstrating that a
technological development plausibly created a significant risk to health,
safety, or the environment. Second, the agency would, in consultation
with affected parties, decide on conditions for randomized experiments
with the new risky activity and possible means to regulate it. Third, the
agency would, if necessary, impose moratoria or other temporary limits
on the risky technology outside of the experiment to protect the
experiment’s controls, protect the public in the interim, and prevent
entrenchment. Fourth, the agency’s actions would be subject to judicial
review to ensure that the risk was plausible and significant and that
the experiments and moratoria were appropriately limited in time and
scope.
A. Plausibility Standard
The philosophy of the Experimentalist model of regulation is to
vary the power an agency is granted with the information it has
available. It would not alter existing administrative law requiring that
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rules must survive notice and comment rulemaking, cost-benefit
analysis, and thorough judicial review to be permanent. But an agency
would be granted power to implement a moratorium if it could
demonstrate that an emerging technology plausibly created a
significant risk to health, safety, or the environment.
The aim of the plausibility standard is to allow agencies to act
notwithstanding scientific uncertainty. A risk is plausible if the theory
suggesting the potential harm is consistent with existing scientific
evidence.122 The available evidence need not establish the likelihood of
the risk. The plausibility standard would not require that an agency
provide even one study showing evidence of the risk. Yet not all
perceived risks would pass the standard.
Consider, for example, fluoridation of the public water supply.
Extensive research establishes that drinking water with small
quantities of sodium fluoride added reduces tooth decay by about 25%
over a lifetime.123 According to the CDC, “[t]he weight of the peerreviewed scientific evidence does not support an association between
water fluoridation and any adverse health effect or systemic
disorder . . . .”124 At least in some communities, however, the public
continues to fear that fluoridation poses serious health risks. For
example, in 2013, the electorate of Portland, Oregon voted, by a 60
percent to 40 percent margin, to oppose fluoridation of the public water
supply, continuing the city’s longstanding ban on the practice.125
A purported risk from fluoridation, because it is inconsistent
with existing scientific evidence, would fail a plausibility test. Part IV
will argue that the risk that fracking could contaminate groundwater,
the risk that e-cigarettes could increase tobacco consumption, and the
risk that autonomous vehicles could increase traffic fatalities would all
pass the plausibility test. The plausibility standard undoubtedly leads
to borderline cases, but the basic concept—that agencies should be able

122. Cf. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (“Asking for plausible
grounds to infer [a factual conclusion] does not impose a probability requirement[;] . . . it simply
calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [that
factual conclusion].”).
123. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CMTY. WATER FLUORIDATION:
FLUORIDATION BASICS (July 28, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/fluoridation/basics/index.htm
[http://perma.cc/MV77-KXGN].
124. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CMTY. WATER FLUORIDATION: HEALTH
EFFECTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT (July 10, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/fluoridation/safety/
health_effects.htm [http://perma.cc/GVW3-HGQV].
125. See Ryan Kost, Portland Fluoride: For the Fourth Time Since 1956, Portland Voters
Reject Fluoridation, OREGONIAN, May 21, 2013, http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/
2013/05/portland_fluoride_for_the_four.html [http://perma.cc/RTH6-4MXB].
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to act with evidence of only a potential risk—is critical to effective
regulation of emerging risks.
B. Experiment Power
The word “experiment” is sometimes used expansively in
political debates about emerging technologies. But, as Part II argued,
these phrases are misleading. Market activity is not the deliberate
product of a neutral experimenter aiming to learn about a new
technology. It is the spontaneous, decentralized activity of firms seeking
to profit from bringing a new technology to market. Experimental
conditions are designed, or at least should be designed, to achieve
accurate results, whereas it would be absurd to suggest that firms
should be neutral about what benefits and risks their new technological
innovations bring. Similarly, although individual state or local
governments may conduct experiments with new regulatory policies,
the entire set of such policies as a whole is not centrally organized or
subject to experimental controls.126 This lack of organization creates the
possibility of selection effects and cautions against treating the results
of state and local policy innovations as the results of scientific
experiments. The Experimentalist model is different: agencies would be
empowered to conduct non-metaphorical experiments.
One benefit of focusing agencies on acquiring information before
they propose a rule is to increase the likelihood that regulators will
approach an issue with an open mind. Because agencies will not yet
have psychologically committed to a particular regulatory solution,
their information acquisition may be less influenced by confirmation
bias.127 This is not to say that agencies will be completely neutral about
future regulation. That they have initiated the new powers presumes
that these agencies consider the risk to be plausible. But focusing
regulators on acquiring information, rather than defending a proposed
126. For a discussion of how the federal government can use its subdivisions and regional
offices to direct and coordinate local-level experimentation with different regulatory approaches,
see David Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58, 116–20 (2016). For the
observation that the federal government is well-positioned to use federal law to encourage statebased experimentation when states are not experimenting at optimal levels, see Abbe Gluck,
Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in
Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 566–68 (2011).
127. The law and behavioral economics literature sometimes analyzes confirmation bias with
the related, more general concept of self-serving biases, which cause us to interpret information so
as to promote our self-interest. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1051, 1093 (2000) (describing what the authors call “the ‘confirmatory’ or ‘self-serving’ bias,”
which they define as “the term to describe the observation that actors often interpret information
in ways that serve their interests or preconceived notions”).
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rule, might make them more open to revising their prior actions than
they are in maintaining the status quo.
1. Benefits of Randomization
The main benefit of experiments is that they would produce
better information through randomization.128 Randomized experiments
are “[t]he gold standard for estimating the causal impact of a
regulation.”129 In a randomized experiment, subjects are deliberately
assigned to treatment or control groups randomly.130 If the experiment
is of a sufficient size, the law of large numbers ensures that the
treatment will be the best causal explanation for any observed
differences in outcome between the two groups.131
In the context of a regulatory experiment, randomization
requires that whether a participant is exposed to a risky technology (the
treatment group) or not (the control group) be intentionally
randomized. Regulators could choose multiple treatment groups in
which different means of mitigating the risk are tested. The results of
a multi-treatment experiment would give regulators a menu of different
regulatory options to consider when they move to a cost-benefit analysis
for permanent regulation.132
Risk-creating firms would have an incentive to suggest potential
means for efficiently mitigating a risk if they predicted complying with
the rule mandating those means would be less costly than a rule that
the agency might otherwise promulgate. An agency would not be legally
required to test out firm-proposed ideas, but would have an incentive to
do so because although the conditions of the experiment itself would not
be subject to judicial review, whatever permanent rule the agency
ultimately promulgated would be. A regulated firm could use an
128. Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 939–46.
129. Greenstone, supra note 34, at 116.
130. Indeed, “[r]andom selection thus is not haphazard selection or selection by convenience—
it follows very specific rules and, in the vast majority of studies, will occur only if the researcher
intentionally chooses to invoke it.” Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 108–09 (2002).
131. Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 934–37.
132. Notwithstanding the benefits of randomized regulatory experiments, regulatory agencies
rarely use them. See id. at 931 (noting only a “handful of exceptions” to the lack of randomized
regulatory experiments). One notable exception is the FDA, which relies heavily on randomized
clinical trials for its regulation of pharmaceuticals. See Jennifer J. Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish
the “Gold Standard” for New Drug Approval? Redefining “Substantial Evidence” in the FDA
Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 127, 131 (1999) (briefly explaining the history of
the FDA’s preference for randomized clinical trials and explaining that a “properly conducted
[randomized clinical trial] permits an accurate, objective, and scientific assessment of whether a
treatment works—and if so, how effective it is”).
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agency’s failure to test out the firm’s proposed risk-mitigating measure
to challenge the analysis underlying the permanent rule.
2. Practical Challenges to Randomized Experiments
There are real challenges in implementing randomized
experiments in natural environments, even when the experimental
subjects are cooperating. These challenges include: attrition133—
subjects might quit the experiment; crossover134—subjects might switch
from one group to another; and spillover135—subjects in one group
might be affected by treatments applied to another group. But all of
these challenges can be overcome. Attrition can be managed through a
large sample size and by randomly pre-pairing each subject with
subjects from other groups, so that the pair as a whole can be cut out of
the experiment if one member quits.136 Crossover and spillover effects
can be more difficult to police, but carefully monitoring the experiment
while it is ongoing and limiting the risky technology outside of the
experiment with the moratorium power will help.
Another worry is that, in some instances, a treatment may affect
individual subjects differently enough that information about
population effects is not useful for future rulemaking. Some have
argued, for example, that, as genomics research leads to more
personalized medicine, the FDA’s insistence on randomized trials
designed to observe net effects on a large population has become
misguided.137 One can imagine analogues of this argument in other risk
regulation contexts in which exposure to a risk has heterogeneous
effects. But this is really an argument against drawing all-or-nothing
policy conclusions from randomized experiments rather than an
argument against conducting them. In fact, regulated firms can and
should use evidence from randomized experiments to argue that, even
if some risk should be banned for the overall population, it should be
permitted for some narrow subpopulation or under some specialized
conditions where the experiment suggests atypical results.138
133. Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 957–59.
134. Id. at 959–60.
135. Id. at 960.
136. Id. at 958–59.
137. See PETER W. HUBER, THE CURE IN THE CODE 103–12 (2013) (criticizing “The Fading
Myth of the FDA’s ‘Gold Standard’ ”).
138. Firms do so after FDA clinical trials, although in some cases this can create the problem
of “data dredging”—scouring statistical data for some subgroup that could technically be argued
to have a benefit, even if that benefit is just an artifact of the data. See generally Anup Malani et
al., Accounting for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in the FDA Approval Process, 67 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 23 (2012) (explaining and proposing a solution to the data dredging problem).
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A more powerful objection to this way of implementing
regulatory experiments is that scientific practice generally counsels
against relying too much on the results of one experiment, even if it is
a randomized one. Yet allowing time for replication would undermine
many of the benefits of temporary regulation. There is an inevitable
tradeoff between allowing time for experiment replication and quickly
implementing the regulation that early experimental results support.139
One carefully controlled, large group size, federal regulatory
experiment will likely be more useful than uncontrolled market
innovation or state and local policy innovation. Moreover, although the
length of experiments and moratoria would be subject to judicial review,
courts would not be precluded from allowing an agency to conduct an
additional experiment or extend a moratorium if early results proved
inconclusive.
3. Ethical Challenges to Randomized Experiments
Some randomized regulatory experiments have been criticized
on ethical grounds. For example, consider randomized experiments on
the effectiveness of social welfare programs.140 Assigning someone to a
control group means denying someone a benefit, which is effectively
making that individual worse off so that society might gain policy
knowledge. To some extent, this worry is a product of framing effects.
It appears less objectionable to conduct a random experiment with a
previously unavailable social benefit than to experiment with a benefit
to which some individuals are entitled under existing law. But in either
case, the experimenter has a partial response. If the benefit does not
achieve the desired result, no harm is done. If the benefit does achieve
the result, the prospects of the benefit program persisting over the long
run improve, thereby serving the long-term interests of the individuals
from whom the benefit is temporarily withheld. This is, however, only
a partial response. There is still a potential short-term harm done to
the subjects denied a benefit, and that must be factored into the overall
normative evaluation of whether the experiment is worthwhile.

139. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1437 (2011) (“The agent's marginal research benefit from investing an
additional unit of effort in research is simply the difference between the research payoff and the
default payoff. Thus, the strength of the agent's research incentive is a decreasing function of her
default payoff and an increasing function of her research payoff.”).
140. This is not a hypothetical scenario. Abramowicz and collaborators explain that most
randomized policy “experiments have been in the area of social services, testing whether
expenditures on entitlements succeed in achieving social goals, such as reducing poverty.”
Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 932; see also id. at 932–33 (listing examples).
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In clinical trials, the answer is informed consent: patients will
generally only enter experiments with new drugs if their medical
condition is dire enough to take the risk. But even in clinical trials, the
tradeoff re-emerges as the experimenters begin to observe differences
between the control group and the treatment group and do not
immediately relay that knowledge to the subjects. So in clinical trials,
as in social benefit experiments, it is often imperative to end
experiments early when enough evidence has accumulated that the
interests of the subjects in the less fortunate group outweigh the
marginal benefits of increased confidence in the results.141
These considerations—short-term harm, informed consent, and
early termination—should be incorporated into regulatory
experiments. Regulators should acknowledge that subjects in an
experiment will be exposed to a risk over the short-term and consider
whether the experiment is still warranted or whether the technology
simply ought to be banned outright. Whether those risks can be
voluntarily accepted through informed consent will often be critical to
the decision. Regulators will sometimes face a difficult tradeoff between
ending an experiment early and entering into rulemaking with less
confidence versus letting the experiment continue and maintaining risk
exposure or limits on a seemingly innocuous technology. But those
decisions are difficult only because randomized experiments can
produce socially useful knowledge.
C. Moratorium Power
A moratorium on a new risky technology would serve two aims:
protecting the reliability of experimental conditions and preventing
entrenchment. For many emerging risks, an agency might be able to
achieve these goals with restrictions short of a total moratorium on the
technology outside of the experimental conditions. All things being
equal, agencies should choose the least restrictive means consistent
with those goals.142 Yet total moratoria will sometimes be necessary and
can be justified.

141. See Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 973 (“[I]t is standard protocol to shut down
medical trials early if it becomes clear that either the control or treatment therapy is superior.”).
142. This prescription does not entail that the decision about means should be subject to
judicial review. Determining what the least restrictive means to protect experiments and prevent
entrenchment are may require a judgment call in the face of scientific uncertainty.
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1. Protecting Experimental Conditions
For a randomized experiment to work, a sufficient number of the
initial subjects need to remain in their assigned treatment or control
group until the end of the experiment.143 For at least some types of risks,
permitting the risky technology outside of the experiment will increase
the chance of interference with the experiment. There could be
crossover effects because subjects in the control group participated in
the risky activity outside of the experiment or subjects in a riskmitigation treatment group participated in the risky activity without
the benefit of the risk-mitigating measure. Imagine a pharmaceutical
trial in which a subject in a control group consumes a drug with similar
properties outside of the experiment. There could also be spillover
effects because subjects in a control group were exposed to the risky
technology because of its presence outside of the experimental
conditions. Imposing a moratorium on the technology outside of the
experiment is the simplest way to solve these problems.
2. Preventing Entrenchment
The moratorium power would allow agencies to preserve a broad
set of regulatory options.144 The most straightforward justification for
preserving options is to prevent interest groups from blocking them. If
a regulation is otherwise justified, the political reality that wellfinanced, well-organized firms possess interest group power is not a
good reason to oppose the regulation. Rather, it is a good reason to
prevent that political reality from developing in the first instance.
Two important predictors of interest group power are wealth and
organization. A moratorium can temporarily prevent risk-creating
firms from acquiring both. The moratorium limits the growth and
profits of risk-creating firms. This can be a direct effect of restricting
the risky technology to sites or subjects randomly selected to participate
in the experiment. It can also be an indirect result of the signal that the
moratorium sends to investors: regulators are serious about reducing

143. See Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 957 (explaining that attrition is a problem in part
because it reduces sample size).
144. The basic idea that risk regulation policy should be concerned with preserving future
options is familiar, but scholars have not generally emphasized preserving political options. See,
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 896 (2006)
(concluding that real option theory suggests that “those who make environmental policy, should
find it worthwhile to invest resources to preserve flexibility for the future”). See generally Michael
A. Livermore, Patience Is An Economic Virtue: Real Options, Natural Resources, and Offshore Oil,
84 U. COLO. L. REV. 581 (2013) (applying real-option theory to nonrenewable resource extraction).
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this risk and, depending on the results of the experiment, the risky
technology might be limited, or even prohibited, permanently.
Investors might still decide to bet on the risk-creating firms
nonetheless, because they expect that the experimental results will be
favorable for the firms and lead to less restrictive regulation. In that
case, the firms might still be able to grow during the course of the
experiment. But that is not a bad outcome. To the extent that investors
base their decisions on private information that the relevant risk is not
as bad as feared or can be inexpensively mitigated, they are relying on
information that indicates that stricter regulation might not be justified
and that interest group entrenchment will not be problematic. The
critical point is that, because of the moratorium, investors will be
betting on facts about the risk and its potential for cost-effective
mitigation, rather than on the risk-creating firm’s likelihood of evading
justified regulation through interest group power.
A moratorium will also limit risk-creating firms’ ability to
organize for similar reasons. A fledgling industry with small start-ups
facing regulatory uncertainty will less rapidly form a trade association
with sophisticated lobbyists. To the extent that the experiment tests out
risk-mitigating measures that might benefit some firms more than
others, the experiment and moratorium period might even pit some of
the risk-creating firms against each other.
In the narrower set of cases where there is a justification for
preventing social norm entrenchment, a moratorium could also achieve
that aim. By restricting the use of the new technology to experimental
conditions, social norms might not crystallize around its use. How that
dynamic would work would depend on the specific social facts
surrounding the particular technology. Part IV explores this possibility
for the particular technologies it analyzes in greater detail.
3. Moratoria and Capture
One might object to granting agencies a moratorium power on
the basis that the power itself could become a tool of interest groups.
Interest group theory predicts that incumbent firms in an industry will
seek to capture regulatory agencies to impose barriers to entry into
their market.145 It is conceivable that, in a captured agency, the
moratorium power could be used to impose temporary restrictions on a
new technology as a means to stifle potential competition to the
incumbent firms.
145. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3, 5 (1971).
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The problem with this objection is that incumbent firms have a
countervailing incentive to oppose regulation that would limit the
future size of their market, particularly if they could consolidate the
expanded market by acquiring new entrants. Consider e-cigarettes: the
major tobacco firms could have responded to the rise of start-ups selling
e-cigarettes by seeking regulation to ban the technology. For a brief
political moment, that might have been possible. But the tobacco firms
eventually realized that e-cigarettes could expand their customer base
and either started their own lines of e-cigarettes or acquired the new
entrants.146 Banning e-cigarettes would have foreclosed what the
tobacco firms came to view as a profit opportunity. Of course, this
market consolidation occurred in a world without a moratorium power.
One cannot know how it would have played out in a counterfactual
world in which agencies had such power available. But the same
economic incentive favoring expanding markets would hold.
The moratorium power’s capacity to prevent interest group
entrenchment is strongest when an agency can act while there is
neither a united industry coalition opposing regulation nor one aiming
to capture an agency to impose regulation. That moment is possible
when agencies first become aware of an emerging risk, or so Part IV
will argue.
4. Alternatives to Moratoria
Agencies could also choose to impose other limits on the risky
technology short of a moratorium. If it did not interfere with
experimental conditions, they could permit firms to continue working
with the risky technology within certain limits of time, space, or
intensity or while employing a particular risk-mitigating measure.
With some risks, an agency might simply forbid sale or marketing of
the risky product to consumers, or to some especially vulnerable subset
of consumers. Agencies could also make permission to continue working
with the risky technology contingent on the firm allowing more
intrusive observation, so that use of the technology would be easy to
halt if the experimental results suggested the risk warranted it. The
optimal set of limitations will vary by risk. Restrictions short of a total
moratorium might, in some cases, protect the experiment and prevent
entrenchment.

146. For more on the consolidation of the e-cigarette market, see infra Section IV.B.
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D. Circumscribed Judicial Review
There are good reasons not to shield all agency decisions with
experiment and moratorium powers from judicial review. Most of the
traditional arguments for judicial review of agency action—statutory
compliance, congressional monitoring, the threat of capture, and
quality control—would still apply.147 In addition, the new powers would
give regulatory agencies more authority to impose burdens on riskcreating firms than they currently possess. The special features of
emerging risks—the factual uncertainty they present and the short
political window for action they allow—justify those new powers. But
agencies may be tempted to use them as an end run around the sluggish
rulemaking process.148 Protecting the powers from judicial review
would exacerbate the temptation to use them as a de facto regulatory
tool.
But some agency decisions in implementing experiments and
moratoria do merit protection. With emerging risks, agencies will lack
rigorous evidence establishing the likelihood or magnitude of harm that
the source of risk could create. Agencies will sometimes also need to test
multiple means of mitigating those risks. An agency’s decision about
which means to test will involve considerable discretion, and, given the
lack of basic information about the risk, will be difficult to justify
conclusively. Judicial review of these issues—facts about the risk and
choices about which regulatory means to test—would constrain the
flexibility that the new powers were intended to provide.
1. Judicial Review of the Experiment and Moratorium Powers
Judicial review of agency experiments and moratoria should be
limited to the perimeter: decisions about when a moratorium should
start, when it should end, and what its scope should be—that is, what
risks are covered—while it is ongoing. Details internal to how the
experiments should be conducted and the ideal content of the
moratorium should be shielded.
The plausibility standard should be subject to judicial review. It
is intended to screen out theories of risk inconsistent with the best

147. See supra Section I.A.3.
148. An early empirical study “speculated . . . that reviewing courts’ imposition of
adjudicatory-type procedural and evidentiary burdens on rulemaking during [the period of the
study] may have had the perverse effect of discouraging its use.” Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald
Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 984, 1057 (1990). If this speculation is correct, providing agencies with new powers more
flexible than rulemaking might tempt agencies to substitute use of those powers for rulemaking.
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available scientific evidence. The plausibility standard has the effect of
a weak regulatory priority-setting device:149 if an agency seeks to
initiate an experiment and a moratorium for a risk that does not
plausibly create a significant harm to health, safety, or the
environment, it will be a red flag that the agency’s priorities were
misplaced. It might even be evidence of agency capture. The courts
should not be setting agencies’ priorities for them. But the minimum
threshold of the plausibility standard can serve as a check on
egregiously misplaced priorities.
Federal courts are, of course, familiar with making plausibility
determinations from their experience with motions to dismiss.150 Once
the agency satisfied the plausibility standard, it need not provide any
more evidence of the risk being regulated until it ultimately
promulgated a rule to regulate it.
Judicial review should also ensure that an agency’s experiment
and moratorium are limited in time and scope. How long a moratorium
should last could be a difficult question, and courts should give some
deference to agency judgments. But agencies must be subject to judicial
review on their decisions about the length of moratoria to prevent them
from using moratoria as de facto regulation. Agencies’ good faith
experimental goals should be the decisive factor in setting the length of
a moratorium.
The scope of the risk should also receive judicial scrutiny. A risk
like “e-cigarettes” is neatly defined. A risk like “biotechnology” would
be too amorphous. A risk like “nanotechnology” would present a more
complicated question. One can define “nanotechnology” as any
technology at nanoscale.151 But that definition is broad enough to
encompass technologies for a myriad of industrial and consumer uses
that could create a broad range of safety risks.152 Courts should
probably permit experiments and moratoria for nanotechnology, but the
closeness of this issue suggests that some line-drawing problems will be
inevitable.
As with any area of repeated judicial review, courts can selfcalibrate through the development of precedent. Issues such as what
makes a risk “plausible,” how long a moratorium should last, and what
149. See John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure
in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277, 311–13 (1992) (proposing a “de minimis risk”
standard as a tool for agency priority-setting in toxic risk regulation).
150. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The leading cases on the 12(b)(6) plausibility standard are Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
151. For a similar definition, see Mandel, supra note 13, at 1328 (defining nanotechnology as
pertaining to “a variety of activities that involve manipulating matter at an atomic scale”).
152. Id. at 1340–45.
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kind of definition should limit the scope of a “risk”—or at least what
range of discretion agencies should have over those questions—will
gradually resolve themselves through precedent.
2. Judicial Review of Subsequent Rules
The division between issues subject to and protected from
judicial review discussed above applies only to agency action during and
about the experiments and moratoria. At the end of the experimental
period, if the agency sought to promulgate a permanent rule, it would
need to proceed through a conventional rulemaking. That rulemaking
would then be subject to judicial review, just like any other agency
action.
Agencies should have discretion to retain the moratoria or other
limits during the rulemaking that follows an experiment. If agencies
lacked that discretion, then each time an agency adopted a strict
moratorium and experiments demonstrated that the risk justified a
permanent ban, the agency would be compelled to relax the restrictions
as it crafted the permanent rule, immediately after acquiring evidence
that the restrictions were justified.
Administrative law has confronted a similar problem before.
Until 1993, courts that held rules to be “arbitrary and capricious” would
generally vacate the rules when they remanded them to the agencies.153
But in Allied-Signal v. NRC, the D.C. Circuit recognized that “the
consequences of vacating may be quite disruptive” and remanded a rule
without vacatur.154 Likewise, the consequences of lifting a moratorium
during a rulemaking designed to convert that moratorium into a
permanent rule justify giving agencies a brief extension so that they
have time to carry a proposed rule through the rulemaking process.
The shadow of a judicial challenge to a post-experiment
rulemaking would create incentives for agencies and regulated firms
during the experiment.155 The results of the regulatory experiment
would effectively create presumptions for the subsequent rulemaking.
If the expected risk were not observed, agencies would be hard pressed
to justify continued regulation. If a particular means to mitigate the
risk worked, the agency would likely conduct a cost-benefit analysis for
153. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59,
75 (1995).
154. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 151 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
155. The metaphor of parties’ bargaining in the “shadow of the law” as result of judicially
created incentives started with Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 997 (1979).
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adopting it. Failure to do so would leave the agency especially
vulnerable to judicial challenge from firms who would have preferred
some other means of mitigating the risk.
The net effect of circumscribed judicial review for the
experiment moratorium—and conventional judicial review for
whatever rule the agency adopts following it—would be to give agencies
broad discretion to experiment with different regulatory options, but
compel them to make the resulting regulation empirically informed.
IV. APPLICATIONS
This Part applies the Experimentalist model to the regulation of
three emerging risks: fracking, e-cigarettes, and autonomous vehicles.
With fracking and e-cigarettes, regulators still lack answers to basic
questions that would be critical to sensible regulation. While the
information deficit surrounding autonomous vehicles cannot be reduced
to a set of specific questions, there is still massive uncertainty about the
effects these vehicles would have on safety and thus a strong case for
controlled testing.
Each of these emerging risks also raises an entrenchment
problem. Unfortunately, for both fracking and e-cigarettes, interest
groups may already be entrenched, but there was some point in the past
decade in which that entrenchment could have been halted. For ecigarettes, we may have missed the window for preventing social norm
entrenchment as well. With autonomous vehicles, the main worry is
reverse social norm entrenchment, and that window may soon elapse.
But even if our ability to prevent entrenchment of these particular risks
has declined, the plausibility of having done so at some point suggests
the importance of moratoria for future emerging risks.
A. Fracking
In the past several years, the deployment of new techniques to
extract previously unreachable oil and gas has transformed the energy
sector. The United States has passed Russia as the world’s largest
producer of natural gas, and is also predicted to pass Saudi Arabia as
the largest producer of oil by the end of the decade.156 The leading cause
of the boom is hydraulic fracturing, or fracking—creating fractures in

156. Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic
Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 147 (2013).
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layers of shale and tight rock with pressurized liquid to release oil and
gas.157
Fracking has been in commercial use since 1949, but it was only
in the 2000s that the practice became widespread.158 The recent rise of
fracking is in part due to another technique, horizontal drilling, in
which vertical drills are extended sideways once they reach the desired
layer, so as to maximize contact with the rock containing oil or gas.159
These techniques have been enormously profitable for the gas and oil
industries, but they have also raised questions about risks to health,
safety, and the environment.
1. Risks and Benefits
Some of the risks fracking creates are familiar from other
industrial activities. Fracking operations emit conventional air
pollutants: methane, volatile organic compounds, and so-called
naturally occurring radioactive materials.160 Fracking also consumes
massive quantities of water.161 When fracking wastewater is disposed
of, the force can induce earthquakes; the earthquake risk is not new to
fracking, but it has nonetheless received significant recent attention.162
One risk fracking might create that is genuinely new—and
possibly merits new regulation—is the risk of groundwater
contamination.163 The main potential contaminant is the fracking fluid
itself; there are several plausible ways in which the chemicals in
fracking fluid could get into groundwater.164 It is also possible that
fracking could contaminate the groundwater in other ways by releasing
methane, by disturbing sludge already present in wells, or through the
disposal of fracking waste.165 Only a small number of limited studies
have attempted to assess the risks of fracking fluid contaminating

157. For a concise but detailed explanation of how fracking works, see Hannah Wiseman,
Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to
Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 117–21 (2009).
158. For an account of the history, see id. at 121–27.
159. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 156, at 153–54; see also Wiseman, supra note157, at 120
(explaining how horizontal drilling fits into fracking).
160. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 156, at 172–75.
161. See id. at 177–79 (“EPA estimates that fracturing will consume as much water as 5
million people if 35,000 wells are fractured each year.”).
162. See id. at 179–80 (detailing earthquake risks in different stages of fracturing and state
regulatory response).
163. Id. at 180.
164. Id. at 180–81.
165. Id. at 192–96.
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groundwater.166 A recent review of the evidence concluded that “[t]he
magnitude of all these risks is uncertain and highly contested.”167
The EPA conducted an investigation of fracking’s effects on
groundwater contamination in Pavillion, Wyoming and released a draft
report in 2011, which concluded that “the explanation best fitting the
data for the deep monitoring wells is that constituents associated with
hydraulic fracturing have been released into the [local] drinking water
aquifer at depths above the current production zone.”168 But, after
intense criticism of the draft report, the EPA turned over the
investigation to the Wyoming state government, and the research was
funded in part by Encana Oil and Gas, the firm responsible for the
fracking operation that may have contaminated the water.169 The final
report, released in 2015, concluded that “it is unlikely that hydraulic
fracturing fluids have risen to shallower depths intercepted by watersupply wells,” although it noted the possibility that preexisting gas
wells could have served as a conduit for some contamination.170
According to its proponents, the economic benefits of fracking
and the associated oil and gas boom have been dramatic. IHS, a leading
energy analysis firm funded by the industry, has estimated that
unconventional oil and gas operations contributed $283 billion to the
gross domestic product and employed 2.1 million workers in 2012.171
Fracking also reduces energy prices for US consumers. IHS has
predicted that “[b]etween 2012 and 2015, the gain in average annual
disposable household income [will be] $926 per year as a result of the
lower natural gas prices brought about by” unconventional natural

166. See id. at 187–91 (detailing six studies); see also Garth T. Llewellyn, Evaluating a
Groundwater Supply Contamination Incident Attributed to Marcellus Shale Gas Development, 112
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6325 (2015).
167. Id. at 187.
168. Draft Investigation of Ground Water Contamination near Pavillion, Wyoming, EPA, 33
(2011),
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/EPA_ReportOnPavillion_Dec-82011.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6KJ-TUJD].
169. Abraham Lustgarten, EPA’s Abandoned Wyoming Fracking Study One Retreat of Many,
PROPUBLICA (July 3, 2013, 11:58 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/epas-abandonedwyoming-fracking-study-one-retreat-of-many [http://perma.cc/25PC-4STP].
170. WYO. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, PAVILLION, WYOMING AREA DOMESTIC WATER WELLS
DRAFT FINAL REPORT AND PALATABILITY STUDY 107 (2015), http://deq.wyoming.gov/media/
attachments/Water%20Quality/Pavillion%20Investigation/Draft%20Report/01_Pavillion%20WY
%20Area%20Domestic%20Water%20Wells%20Draft%20Final%20Report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
MS66-VPSM].
171. America’s New Energy Future: The Unconventional Oil and Gas Revolution and the US
Economy, Volume 3: A Manufacturing Renaissance, IHS 41 (2013), http://www.energyxxi.org/
sites/default/files/pdf/Americas_New_Energy_Future_Phase3.pdf [http://perma.cc/YV6T-A8M5].
Merrill and Schizer take IHS data at face value. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 156, at 148 n.3.
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gas.172 Finally, the increase in production is also changing the balance
of trade.173 The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) predicts
that, due in part to continued growth in shale gas production resulting
from “the dual application of horizontal drilling and hydraulic
fracturing,” the United States will become a net exporter of natural gas
in 2017.174
Some critics have questioned how long the boom in
unconventional oil and gas will last, even if regulation does not limit
it.175 In parts of Wyoming, the early natural gas boom has already
faded, and “getting drilling companies who claim to be on the verge of
collapse to take responsibility for wells they still technically own has
proved difficult.”176 An assessment of the costs and benefits of fracking
should include the economic and social costs of a potential bust as much
as the benefits of the current boom.177
The most important effect of fracking is its impact on climate
change. Natural gas is less carbon-intensive than coal. Natural gas
emits 117 lbs. of CO2 per million Btu of energy while coal emits between
214 and 229 lbs.178 Therefore, replacing coal-fired power with gas-fired
power will result in lower carbon emissions.179 Those reductions already
172. The Economic and Employment Contributions of Shale Gas in the United States, IHS 26
(2011),
http://energyindepth.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Shale-Gas-Economic-Impact-Dec2011_EMB1.pdf [http://perma.cc/X6HF-SYEK].
173. I do not mean to imply that a more favorable balance of trade for the United States is
obviously desirable. If one evaluates domestic risk regulation policy from a cosmopolitan
perspective, it might not be.
174. Annual Energy Outlook 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. E-11 (Apr. 2015),
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2015).pdf [http://perma.cc/6W9N-763R].
175. See, e.g., Asjylyn Loder, U.S. Shale-Oil Boom May Not Last as Fracking Wells Lack
Staying Power, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/2013-10-10/u-dot-s-dot-shale-oil-boom-may-not-last-as-fracking-wells-lack-staying-power
[http://perma.cc/574Q-DJUY].
176. Dan Frosch, Wyoming May Act to Plug Abandoned Wells as Natural Gas Boom Ends,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/25/us/state-may-act-to-plugabandoned-wyoming-wells-as-natural-gas-boom-ends.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/95RF-8JBE].
177. For an assessment of the economic and social costs of fracking, see, for example, Susan
Christopherson & Ned Rightor, The Boom-Bust Cycle of Shale Gas Extraction Economies, CARDI
REP. (Cornell Univ. Cmty. & Reg’l Dev. Inst., Ithica, N.Y.), Sep. 2011, at 4, 4–6,
http://assembly.state.ny.us/member_files/125/20110915/index.pdf, [http://perma.cc/KNK3-2G8K];
Jaffrey Jacquet, Energy Boomtowns & Natural Gas: Implications for Marcellus Shale Local
Governments & Rural Communities, 13–23, 24 (Ne. Reg’l Ctr. for Rural Dev., Paper No. 43, 2009).
178. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., HOW MUCH CARBON DIOXIDE IS PRODUCED WHEN DIFFERENT
FUELS ARE BURNED?, http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=73&t=11 (last updated June 18,
2015) [http://perma.cc/ZLS6-E4GF].
179. Some authorities contest the claim that fracking will necessarily result in climate
benefits, given certain unknowns about the risk of methane leakage during the process of
gathering natural gas from production sites. One peer-reviewed study found higher rates of
methane emissions at fracking sites compared to conventional natural gas wells, largely attributed
to “venting of methane at the time that wells are completed.” Robert W. Howarth, A Bridge to
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have begun over the past few years. According to the most recent data
from the EIA, “[t]he natural gas share of electricity generation grew
from approximately 11% in 1990 . . . to 26% in 2014,” which “has
contributed to the decline in carbon intensity of the energy mix since
2008.”180
Some environmental policy experts view the transition from coal
to natural gas caused by fracking as a salutary development. In 2011,
a panel chaired by Ernest Moniz—then the U.S. Secretary of Energy—
issued a report stating that “a combination of demand reduction and
displacement of coal-fired power by gas-fired generation is the lowestcost way to reduce CO2 emissions by up to 50%.”181 The report concedes
that “[f]or more stringent CO2 emissions reductions, further decarbonization of the energy sector will be required,” but concludes that
“natural gas provides a cost-effective bridge to such a low-carbon
future.”182
Some environmentalists nonetheless oppose fracking. For
example, Bill McKibben, a leader in the environmental movement,
admits that “if we could convert our coal-fired power plants to natural
gas . . . carbon emissions would drop.”183 But he worries that natural
gas will “crowd out truly low-carbon sources of power: abundant and
cheap natural gas would make it that much harder to get sun and wind
(or, if it’s your cup of hot water, nuclear power) up and running on a
large scale.”184 One could add to McKibben’s economic argument the
possibility of interest group entrenchment. Once the nation becomes so
heavily invested in natural gas, energy firms might be able to thwart
regulation that would require a transition to renewable energy.

Nowhere: Methane Emissions and the Greenhouse Gas Footprint of Natural Gas, 2 ENERGY SCI. &
ENG’G 47, 49 (2014). But see A.R. Brandt et al., Methane Leaks from North American Natural Gas
Systems, 343 SCIENCE 733, 733 (2014) (“[A]ssessments using 100-year impact indicators show
system-wide leakage is unlikely to be large enough to negate climate benefits of coal-to-[natural
gas] substitution.”).
180. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. ENERGY-RELATED CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS, 2014
(Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/carbon [http://perma.cc/T36H-WT8Z].
181. ERNEST MONIZ ET AL., THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY
2 (2011), http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/NaturalGas_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/GY4N-JQ8A].
182. Id. (emphasis omitted).
183. Bill McKibben, Why Not Frack?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Mar. 8, 2012),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/mar/08/why-not-frack/
[http://perma.cc/9ZPBAC6Q].
184. Id. The International Energy Agency has echoed this concern. See INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY AGENCY, GOLDEN RULES FOR A GOLDEN AGE OF GAS 80 (Nov. 12, 2012),
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2012/goldenrules/weo2012_goldenrulesrep
ort.pdf [http://perma.cc/5MXJ-4RQS] (“Depending on the type of policies in place, an abundance of
natural gas might diminish the resolve of governments to support low and zero-carbon sources of
energy.”)
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But until renewable energy becomes more efficient and a
political consensus is formed around aggressive climate regulation, the
comparative improvement that natural gas offers over coal may be the
bridge, as Moniz argues. It is at least reasonable to believe that, if
fracking can be done in a way that does not create other countervailing
health or environmental risks, its climate and economic benefits might
justify its costs. The problem now is that we do not know enough about
these potentially countervailing risks.
2. Existing Regulation
Interest group entrenchment has influenced the lax federal
regulation of fracking, though some federal environmental statutes do
apply to the practice. For example, the New Source Performance
Standards contained in the Clean Air Act (“CAA”),185 which controls
certain types of emissions, apply to fracking operations. The EPA has
promulgated a regulation putting those requirements into effect for new
oil and gas operations in 2012.186
But fracking is mostly exempt from federal environmental
statutes.187 In some statutes, fracking is exempted simply because all
oil and gas operations are exempted.188 The most critical exemptions for
fracking in federal environmental statutes, however, were added in the
Energy Policy Act of 2005.189 That legislation amended the Safe Water
Drinking Act (“SWDA”) to exclude fracking from permitting
requirements designed to protect the water in injection wells, unless
the fracking uses diesel fuel.190 It also amended the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”)—which, it is important to note, mostly regulates surface water
rather than groundwater—to expand the exemption for stormwater

185. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (2012).
186. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63).
187. See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 156, at 200 (“Given the traditional primacy of states in
oil and gas regulation, federal law has little to say about fracturing. Indeed, key environmental
statutes exempt the practice.”). For a more detailed summary of the relevant federal law, see
generally ADAM VANN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43152, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING:
SELECTED
LEGAL
ISSUES
(2013),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43152.pdf
[http://perma.cc/HA4E-8HXU].
188. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A) (2012) (exemption in the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2012) (exemption in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act).
189. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (excluding “the underground injection of fluids or
propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related to
oil, gas, or geothermal production activities” from the definition of “[u]nderground injection”).
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runoff from oil and gas operations, including fracking, provided the
stormwater did not come into contact with the wastewater.191
Wastewater remains regulated with a permitting regime under the
CWA.192
Only recently have federal regulators begun to tackle the
groundwater contamination issue. In 2009, in a report attached to an
appropriations bill, Congress “urge[d] EPA to review the risks that
hydraulic fracturing poses to drinking water supplies, using the best
available science, as well as independent sources of information.”193 In
the aftermath of the Pavillion study, the EPA undertook a more
comprehensive study of the groundwater contamination risk.194 It
issued a draft assessment in 2015, in which the EPA concludes that
“there are above and below ground mechanisms by which hydraulic
fracturing activities have the potential to impact drinking water
resources.”195 The assessment “did not find evidence that these
mechanisms have led to widespread, systemic impacts on drinking
water resources in the United States,” but did find “specific instances
where one or more mechanisms led to impacts on drinking water
resources, including contamination of drinking water wells.”196 The
number of instances “was small compared to the number of
hydraulically fractured wells,” but that may have been a result of the
limited availability of data.197
Federal regulation may also soon require that firms disclose the
chemicals they use in fracking. In 2015, the Department of the Interior
published a final rule that would require oil and gas companies to
“public[ly] disclos[e] the chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing” on

191. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2) (2012) (“The Administrator shall not require a permit under
this section . . . for discharges of stormwater runoff from mining operations or oil and gas
exploration . . . which . . . do not come into contact with[ ] any overburden, raw material,
intermediate products, finished product, byproduct, or waste products located on the site of such
operations.”).
192. For a brief discussion of this issue, see Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in
Fracking Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729, 774 (2013).
193. H.R. REP. No. 111-180, at 100 (2009).
194. See generally EPA’s Study of Hydraulic Fracturing for Oil and Gas and Its Potential
Impact on Drinking Water Resources, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/hfstudy (last
visited Oct. 16, 2015) [http://perma.cc/R4B8-BHCJ].
195. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING
FOR
OIL
AND
GAS
ON
DRINKING
WATER
RESOURCES
(2015),
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/hf_es_erd_jun2015.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2LU6-HBDU].
196. Id.
197. Id.
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federal and tribal lands.198 However, industry groups challenged the
regulations in court, and in September 2015 a Wyoming federal judge
granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the rule
pending the outcome of the case.199 In discussing the agency’s likelihood
of success on the merits, the court stressed the absence of “a single
confirmed case of the hydraulic fracturing process contaminating
groundwater.”200 The court agreed that the agency “need not wait for ‘a
catastrophe’ to take action,” but ruled that “there must be substantial
evidence to support the existence of a risk” for the agency’s action to
satisfy the APA’s arbitrary and capricious requirement.201
Further, the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”) generally
requires firms to maintain a record of certain chemicals used in
manufacturing or processing.202 In 2014, the EPA published advanced
notice of a proposed rule that would “develop an approach to obtain
information on chemical substances and mixtures used in hydraulic
fracturing.”203
In the absence of tighter federal regulation, fracking has become
a test case for the Laboratory of Democracy model. In some ways, the
light federal regulation of fracking is consistent with the historical
distribution of policy authority in our federal system. The “regulation
of oil and natural gas exploration and production in the United States
has always been primarily a state matter.”204 Likewise, “regulation of
groundwater contamination has traditionally been left to the states.”205
State responses have varied from strongly precautionary to
effectively Common Law. A complete survey of existing state and local
regulations would require a separate article.206 But it is worth noting
the diversity of such policies. Vermont has enacted a permanent
statutory ban, which flatly states: “No person may engage in hydraulic

198. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128,
16,128 (March 26, 2015) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160).
199. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 15-CV-043, 2015 WL 5845145 (D. Wyo. Sep.
30, 2015) (granting preliminary injunction).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (2012).
203. Hydraulic Fracturing Chemicals and Mixtures, 79 Fed. Reg. 28,664 (proposed May 19,
2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I).
204. David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy
Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 447 (2013).
205. Id. at 490.
206. For a good summary of existing state regulations, with an emphasis on enforcement
patterns, see generally Hannah Wiseman, Fracking Regulation Applied, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 361 (2012).
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fracturing in the State.”207 New York has enacted a ban through the
state’s Department of Environmental Conservation, which denies all
applications for fracking permits.208 In Pennsylvania, fracking is
permitted, but the state’s Department of Environmental Protection
regulates it.209 In many states, though, the primary regulator is the
state oil and gas commission.210
3. Prescriptions
Fracking is—or was—a strong candidate for an experiment and
a federal moratorium. It presents both the need for regulatory learning
and an entrenchment risk. But because the EPA lacks information that
would be relevant for a rulemaking, the federal government has
conducted only a study reliant on voluntary cooperation and has
allowed interest groups to become entrenched.
A key factual question regulators need to answer is whether
fracking contaminates groundwater. If the risk is established,
regulators then need to answer whether regulations can mitigate the
risk. To the extent that information about this risk exists, the firms
conducting the fracking likely possess it. They have little incentive to
be fully forthcoming with this information because it could lead to
increased public opposition, tighter regulation, or tort suits. It is
conceivable that residents who live adjacent to fracking operations have
some evidence of the risk to groundwater, but this evidence will be
scattered and anecdotal.
To imagine how an experiment and a moratorium for fracking
might have worked best, one would need to travel back to the early
2000’s, not long after it first became clear that horizontal drilling and
the new, slickwater fracking technique applied to shales were
economically viable.211 At that point, there would have been a plausible
case that fracking created a significant risk to health and the
environment, but not enough information to start a conventional
rulemaking or conduct a meaningful cost-benefit analysis. This would
have been the prime moment for intervention.
207. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 571 (West 2015).
208. NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL
GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS, AND SOLUTION MINING
REGULATORY
PROGRAM
(2015),
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/
findingstatehvhf62015.pdf, [http://perma.cc/3ZWH-6UFN].
209. Spence, supra note 204, at 455.
210. See, e.g., 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.30 (2015) (assigning regulation to the Railroad
Commission, which is the main oil and gas regulator in the state).
211. See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 156, at 154 (“In 2000, shale supplied negligible
amounts of oil and only 2% of domestically produced natural gas in the U.S.”).
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A randomized experiment, coupled with a moratorium on
fracking outside of the experimental conditions, could have been
possible. The EPA could have set up a lottery, and firms interested in
conducting fracking operations could have entered each site at which
they proposed to drill. The firms also could have suggested possible riskmitigating measures to test. The EPA would have then used the lottery
to randomly assign each site into multiple groups: a control group, an
unrestricted group, and possibly other groups designed to test
promising risk-mitigating measures. Sites assigned to the control group
could not commence operations, but would nonetheless be monitored to
establish baseline conditions. Sites in the unrestricted group could
begin fracking. Sites in the risk-mitigation groups would begin fracking
within the risk-mitigation conditions.
One advantage of a randomized experiment is that the evidence
that it would produce would not be susceptible to the type of site-specific
criticisms that can cloud the results of localized groundwater
contamination studies. For example, one fracking proponent has argued
that “it can be difficult to determine the cause of particular incidents of
alleged groundwater contamination . . . [because] (1) often there are
multiple potential causes of contamination and (2) a lack of baseline
water quality data may make it difficult to know when the
contamination first appeared.”212 On this reasoning, industry groups
have requested baseline testing at fracking sites.213 It is easy to see why
industry would want the tests: they could yield possible explanations
for subsequent evidence of contamination other than fracking
operations. The benefit of a large, randomized experiment is that, if the
groundwater near the sites at which fracking is allowed (the treatment
group) is observed to be contaminated at a significantly higher rate
than it is at sites at which it is prohibited (the control group), there
would be strong evidence that other theories of contamination do not
explain the results.
The main challenge in organizing an experiment like this would
be getting a large sample: firms would need to submit enough sites into
the lottery for the groups to be large enough to measure effects.214 But
firms’ incentives would be well aligned with the agency’s on this issue
because the more sites the firms entered, the greater the chance that
212. Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing and the Baseline Testing of Groundwater, 48 U.
RICH. L. REV. 857, 868 (2014).
213. Id. at 873.
214. See Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 974 (“There is no magic number for all
experiments; a small number of observations may be enough if the measured effect of the
intervention is anticipated to be large, but a large number may be needed for small anticipated
measured effects.”).
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the firms would actually get to start operations. Another potential
worry is that the lottery will give some lucky firms a sufficiently large
competitive advantage that the firm may come to dominate the market.
If some firms are able to grow quickly, they could increase the risk of
entrenchment. But a large-n sample should make any one firm’s
dominance unlikely.
The EPA would also need to carefully monitor that firms
complied with the risk-mitigating measures to police crossover215 and
that they did not conduct fracking outside of the experimental
conditions to police spillover.216 If the experiment worked, the agency
should acquire good evidence on whether groundwater contamination
is likely and whether it can be mitigated. The agency also might monitor
ambient environmental conditions in the areas surrounding the sites
and pick up on any changes, which could provide evidence of
unanticipated risks.217 The EPA could then proceed to rulemaking with
less risk of regulatory error.
It is difficult to imagine a similar regulatory experiment today.
The practical obstacles to shutting down some percentage of the
numerous fracking operations underway might make it infeasible. But
the main reason such an experiment would not be viable is interest
group entrenchment.
The recent fracking boom had its origins in “a number of
independent gas producers,” who “started fiddling around with the idea
that you could combine horizontal drilling with hydraulic fracturing.”218
The “breakthrough” came in 1998, when “an independent gas producer
named George Mitchell, working in the Barnett Shale field near Fort
Worth, Texas, figured out the right combination of horizontal drilling,
pressure, and proppants to get the gas flowing out of shale.”219 The best
window for aggressively regulating fracking was then—when its only
proponents were independent gas producers like Mitchell.
But Mitchell’s “success was observed by other producers, and
they quickly emulated his methods.”220 The structure of the industry
has changed radically. Today, “[l]arge production companies are

215. See id. at 959–60 (explaining other ways to address crossover, but conceding that they
are “imperfect”).
216. See id. at 960 (proposing randomizing by geographical area to address spillover, but also
noting that doing so might create a small sample size).
217. For an explanation of the challenges of effective ambient environmental monitoring, see
Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 22–34 (2011).
218. Thomas W. Merrill, Four Questions About Fracking, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 971, 972
(2013).
219. Id. at 973.
220. Id.
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gradually replacing the small and independent firms that pioneered
this practice.”221 Fracking interests have increasing influence in state
legislatures and Washington. According to a report by Common Cause,
an activist group that tracks money in politics, oil and gas firms
involved in fracking spent $110.2 million on lobbying in 2010, up from
$29.1 million in 2001.222
Perhaps more importantly, local economies have come to rely on
fracking. In the Bakken Shale in North Dakota and Montana, the
Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania and surrounding parts of Appalachia,
and multiple shale plays in Texas and elsewhere, fracking has brought
employment, tax revenue, and new infrastructure—along with health,
safety, and environmental risks.223 It is the perfect storm of interest
group entrenchment: a wealthy but concentrated and organized
industry that has created economic dependence in certain state and
local economies.
There also may be a type of social norm entrenchment taking
place as well. Cultural cognition may be influencing perceptions about
the risks fracking creates. Support for and opposition to fracking
correlates strongly with self-identifying as conservative or liberal
respectively.224 Critically, individuals who report greater familiarity
with fracking are significantly more likely to express strong support or
strong opposition to the practice.225 It is possible that, since fracking
resembles a lot of other industrial processes that create environmental
risks, these cultural cognition effects were inevitable, but it is difficult
to know how public opinion might have developed during a regulatory
experiment. If these cultural divisions calcify, public opinion might not
221. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 156, at 249.
222. James Browning & Melanie McElroy, Deep Drilling, Deep Pockets In Congress &
Michigan, COMMON CAUSE 4 (2011), http://www.commoncause.org/research-reports/National
_111011_Report_Michigan_Deep_Drilling_Deep_Pockets.pdf [http://perma.cc/TP6T-9SLA].
223. Media coverage has been extensive. For one account of the Bakken Shale, see Chip
Brown, North Dakota Went Boom, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 31, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/02/03/magazine/north-dakota-went-boom.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/LF4N-J5TX]; for an
account on the Marcellus Shale, see Eliza Griswold, The Fracturing of Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMES
MAG.
(Nov.
17,
2011)
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/magazine/fracking-amwelltownship.html [http://perma.cc/C5CG-F3Y6]. But see Daniel Raimi & Richard G. Newell, Oil and
Gas Revenue Allocation to Local Governments in Eight States, DUKE U. ENERGY INITIATIVE (Duke
Univ., Durham, N.C.), Oct. 2014, at 4, https://energy.duke.edu/sites/default/files/attachments/
Oil%20Gas%20Revenue%20Allocation%20to%20Local%20Government%20FINAL.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/8BSD-NJDP] (“[S]ome local governments [have] faced fiscal challenges associated
with industry-driven growth in population and heavy vehicle traffic.”).
224. CHRIS CLARKE, HILARY BOUDET, & DYLAN BUGDEN, FRACKING IN THE AMERICAN MIND:
AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON NATURAL GAS DRILLING USING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 13 (2012),
http://climatechangecommunication.org/sites/default/files/reports/Fracking_In_the_American_Mi
nd_2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/W7BQ-KYJ9].
225. Id. at 14.
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be receptive to new evidence about whether fracking risks justify
regulation.
There may still be a window for regulatory action, however. If
the groundwater contamination risks prove to be substantial, and they
can be vividly demonstrated, public opinion might turn against
fracking, even in areas where it has come to dominate the local
economy. The risks might also turn out to be insignificant or susceptible
to mitigation with inexpensive measures. The fracking boom could end
just as rapidly as it began, if some future emerging technology
undercuts its economic rationale. But if the risks do turn out to justify
regulation, the window for regulatory action may have elapsed, in part
due to the structure of administrative law.
B. E-Cigarettes
E-cigarettes are battery-controlled devices that vaporize a liquid
solution containing nicotine to produce a sensation that mimics tobacco
smoking. According to the industry, e-cigarettes provide “enjoyment
without the stigma.”226 But according to the activist group Americans
for Nonsmokers’ Rights, the message the public should be sent is that
“Electronic Cigarettes are NOT a safe alternative!”227 In a proposed rule
published in April 2014, the FDA stated flatly: “We do not currently
have sufficient data about these products to determine what effects ecigarettes have on the public health.”228
What we do know is that use of e-cigarettes is rising rapidly. As
of 2013, the most recent year for which data from a peer-reviewed study
is available, 8.5% of surveyed US adults reported having used ecigarettes at least once, increasing from 3.3% in 2010.229 According to
the CDC’s National Health Interview Survey, which in 2014 included
questions about e-cigarette use for the first time, 12.6% of surveyed US
adults reported ever having tried an e-cigarette.230 According to the
226. E-Cig FAQs, SMOKE-FREE ALT. TRADE ASS’N, http://sfata.org/resources/e-cig-faqs/ (last
visited Oct. 18, 2015) [http://perma.cc/U4LB-VQVA].
FOR
NONSMOKERS’
RIGHTS,
http://www.no227. Electronic
Cigarettes,
AMS.
smoke.org/learnmore.php?id=645 (last visited Oct. 18, 2015) [http://perma.cc/7UC4-RLDK].
228. Deeming Tobacco Products To Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act; Regulations on the Sale
and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for Tobacco Products, 79
Fed. Reg. 23,142, 23,144 (proposed April 25, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1100, 1140, &
1143) [hereinafter Proposed E-Cigarette Rule].
229. Brian A. King et al., Trends in Awareness and Use of Electronic Cigarettes Among US
Adults, 2010–2013, 17 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 219, 221 (2015).
230. CHARLOTTE A. SCHOENBORN & RENEE M. GINDI, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, ELECTRONIC CIGARETTE USE AMONG ADULTS: UNITED STATES, 2014, at 1 (2015),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db217.pdf [http:// perma.cc/ER6X-JCAB].
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CDC’s National Youth Tobacco Survey, as of 2014, 13.4% of high school
students surveyed reported using e-cigarettes in the past 30 days, up
from 1.5% in 2011.231 Even 3.9% of middle school students surveyed
reported e-cigarette usage in the past 30 days,232 up from 0.6% in
2011.233
1. Risks and Benefits
Tobacco smoking causes more than 480,000 deaths in the United
States each year, which makes it the nation’s leading cause of
preventable deaths.234 As of 2014, 16.8% of the adult population
smoked.235 The persistence of tobacco smoking in spite of widespread
awareness of its lethality motivates both the case for and against ecigarettes.
Proponents generally make two arguments. First, “switching to
vaping e-cigarettes instead of smoking combustible cigarettes means
users can avoid the myriad of toxins and other carcinogens created by
tobacco combustion.”236 Second, “[e]-cigarettes have the potential to be
more effective at moving smokers away from traditional cigarettes than
traditional nicotine reduction devices.”237 Proponents point to the
United Kingdom’s Royal College of Physicians, which in June 2014
reiterated its position that, based on the available evidence, “e-

231. René A. Arrazola et al., TOBACCO USE AMONG MIDDLE AND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS —
UNITED STATES, 2011–2014, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2015),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6414a3.htm [http:// perma.cc/D26W-JS85].
232. Id.
233. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NOTES FROM THE FIELD: ELECTRONIC
CIGARETTE USE AMONG MIDDLE AND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS—UNITED STATES, 2011–2012
(2013), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6235a6.htm [http://perma.cc/R4BHYMAJ].
234. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, CURRENT CIGARETTE SMOKING AMONG
ADULTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/
adult_data/cig_smoking/index.htm [http://perma.cc/UL6K-BR4U].
235. Id.
236. Nick Dantonio, Vape Away: Why A Minimalist Regulatory Structure Is The Best Option
for FDA E-Cigarette Regulation, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 1319, 1350 (2014); see also John Tierney, A
Tool to Quit Smoking Has Some Unlikely Critics, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/science/e-cigarettes-help-smokers-quit-but-they-have-someunlikely-critics.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/2EX8-DC3A] (approvingly quoting an e-cigarette
proponent for the view that “[i]t’s time to abandon the myth that tobacco is devoid of benefits, and
to focus on how we can help smokers continue to derive those benefits with a safer delivery
system”).
237. Dantonio, supra note 236, at 1351; see also Tierney, supra note 236 (arguing that
evidence suggests that e-cigarettes will help smokers quit).
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cigarettes could lead to significant falls in the prevalence of smoking in
the UK.”238
Opponents argue that e-cigarettes will “induce nicotine
addiction” in non-smokers and “possibly serv[e] as a gateway product
for subsequent cigarette use.”239 In particular, they contend that
consumers might be misled because e-cigarette firms have (at least
until recently, as we will see below) made unsupported claims about ecigarettes’ safety or effectiveness at helping smokers smoke less.240
Opponents have also claimed that industry has deliberately targeted
youth by marketing e-cigarettes with chocolate, vanilla, and fruit
flavorings,241 which are banned in conventional cigarettes.242 There are
potential secondary risks as well. The FDA has claimed that trace
amounts of toxic chemicals have been found in e-cigarette cartridges.243
The CDC has reported that there has been a rise in calls to poison
control centers about e-cigarette poisoning, 51.1% of which involved
children under age five,244 raising fears that e-cigarettes create a risk of
acute toxicity.
Because e-cigarettes have been in wide use for only a few years,
there is little empirical research that might help assess the competing
claims about the causal relationship between e-cigarette use and
tobacco smoking. When the FDA published its proposed rule on ecigarettes, the agency stated that “[a]lthough e-cigarettes may have
short-term smoking reduction benefits, FDA cautions that long-term
studies are not available to conclude that e-cigarettes are a proven
cessation product.”245 The FDA also stated that it could not “establish
what effects e-cigarettes have in users who might have otherwise quit,
but instead engage in dual use of e-cigarettes and another tobacco
product.”246

238. RCP Statement on E-Cigarettes, ROYAL COLL. OF PHYSICIANS (June 25, 2014),
https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/press-releases/rcp-statement-e-cigarettes
[https://perma.cc/59ZKGWNX].
239. Jordan Paradise, No Sisyphean Task: How the FDA Can Regulate Electronic Cigarettes,
13 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 326, 335 (2013).
240. Id. at 355–56.
241. Id. at 358.
242. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A) (2012).
243. This is consistent with the FDA’s claim, mentioned above, that “[w]e do not currently
have sufficient data about these products to determine what effects e-cigarettes have on the public
health.” Proposed E-Cigarette Rule, supra note 228, at 23,144, 23,157.
244. New CDC Study Finds Dramatic Increase in E-Cigarette-Related Calls to Poison Centers,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (April 3, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/media/
releases/2014/p0403-e-cigarette-poison.html [http://perma.cc/63E8-TG2G].
245. Proposed E-Cigarette Rule, supra note 228, at 23,152.
246. Id.
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The FDA’s summary of the evidence reveals that almost no
randomized studies have been published. One exception is a highprofile randomized control study from New Zealand published in The
Lancet in 2013.247 In the study, 657 adult smokers who wanted to quit
were randomly assigned to e-cigarette, nicotine patch, or placebo ecigarette groups, and the experimenters sought to measure what
percentage of each group was abstinent from smoking six months
later.248 While abstinence was slightly higher in the e-cigarette group,
at 7.3%, than in the patches group, at 5.8%, or the placebo group, 4.1%,
those numbers were much lower than anticipated. As a result, the
experimenters conceded they “had insufficient statistical power to
conclude superiority of nicotine e-cigarettes to patches or to placebo ecigarettes.”249 The New Zealand study does not provide strong evidence
for either side of the e-cigarette debate, but it does demonstrate both
the theoretical possibility—and some of the practical difficulties—of
conducting randomized studies on the effects of e-cigarettes.
2. Existing Regulation
Federal statutes treat drugs and tobacco products differently, so
the set of regulatory options for controlling e-cigarettes depends on its
categorization. The FDA has broad authority under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)250 to regulate drugs to ensure that they are “safe
and effective.”251 The FDCA generally requires that any new drug
receive the FDA’s premarket approval and also empowers the agency to
withdraw approval if it learns that the drug is unsafe or ineffective.252
In 1996, the FDA asserted that nicotine was a “drug” within the
meaning of the FDCA and promulgated a series of regulations intended
to reduce tobacco use among minors.253 In 2000, in FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co., the Supreme Court held, “based on the FDCA’s
overall regulatory scheme and . . . subsequent tobacco legislation, that
Congress has directly spoken to the question at issue and precluded the
FDA from regulating tobacco products.”254

247. Christopher Bullen et al., Electronic Cigarettes for Smoking Cessation: A Randomised
Controlled Trial, 382 LANCET 1629, 1629 (2013).
248. Id. at 1630.
249. Id. at 1633.
250. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399f (2012).
251. Id. § 393(b)(2).
252. Id. § 355(d)–(e).
253. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000).
254. Id. at 160–61.
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Nine years later, Congress responded to Brown & Williamson by
enacting the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of
2009 (“TCA”),255 which amended the FDCA to authorize the FDA to
regulate tobacco.256 The TCA explicitly required that the FDA
reintroduce the rules it promulgated in 1996 that the Court struck down
in Brown & Williamson.257
The TCA includes two new provisions that are potentially
relevant for e-cigarettes. One provision requires premarket review for
any “new tobacco product,” which is defined as a tobacco product “that
was not commercially marketed in the United States as of February 15,
2007.”258 Another provision requires that any “modified risk tobacco
product,”—which is defined as “any tobacco product that is sold or
distributed for use to reduce harm or the risk of tobacco-related disease
associated with commercially marketed tobacco products”—will only be
approved for market when the agency issues an order permitting it.259
An order will be issued only if the agency determines that the new
product would “significantly reduce harm and the risk of tobaccorelated disease to individual tobacco users,” and “benefit the health of
the population as a whole taking into account both users of tobacco
products and persons who do not currently use tobacco products.”260
The FDA’s initial attempt to regulate e-cigarettes did not use
these new authorities under the TCA. Instead, in 2009, the FDA
ordered that a shipment of e-cigarettes from the firm Sottera, which
markets its e-cigarettes under the label NJOY, be denied entry into the
United States on the legal theory that the e-cigarettes were unapproved
drug-device combinations under the FDCA.261 Sottera sued, and, in
Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, the D.C. Circuit rejected the FDA’s theory on the
ground that Sottera had not made any therapeutic claims in advertising
the products.262 The FDA decided not to appeal and stated in a letter
that it would instead regulate e-cigarettes under the TCA.263
In April 2014, the FDA published a proposed rule, which would
deem e-cigarettes to be a “tobacco product” so it could regulate them
255. Tobacco Regulation, Federal Retirement Reform, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776
(2009).
256. 21 U.S.C. § 387a (2012).
257. Id. § 387a-1(a)(2).
258. Id. § 387j(a).
259. Id. § 387k(a)–(b).
260. Id. § 387k(g)(1)(A)–(B).
261. Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
262. Id. at 898.
263. Lawrence R. Deyton & Janet Woodcock, Stakeholder Letter: Regulation of E-Cigarettes
and Other Tobacco Products, FDA (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/
publichealthfocus/ucm252360.htm [http://perma.cc/28CX-AYJT].
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under the TCA.264 The proposed rule states that e-cigarettes likely
“would be considered new tobacco products and would be required to
obtain an order from FDA prior to marketing.”265 It also anticipates that
firms would no longer make any claims that e-cigarettes are “light,”
“low,” or “mild” in light of the modified risk provision.266
In the absence of federal regulation, state laws and local
ordinances have been enacted. According to a list maintained by
Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights, eight states have explicitly
prohibited e-cigarettes in all workplaces, restaurants, and bars.267
Utah, for example, includes e-cigarettes in its ban on smoking in public
places other than retail shops that sell e-cigarettes.268 Sixteen other
states have at least some regulation of e-cigarettes.269 Presently, 475
municipalities have banned e-cigarettes in at least one of workplaces,
restaurants, or bars.270
3. Prescriptions
The New Zealand study demonstrates that the effects of ecigarettes on smoking are amenable to testing. To avoid ethical issues,
regulators could study pre-existing smokers, both those who, like the
participants in the New Zealand study, want to quit,271 and also those
who intend to keep smoking. The experiment should include a control
group that has no access to e-cigarettes, a treatment group that does
have access, and a placebo group. It would be helpful to measure both
the effect on quit rates and on the frequency with which participants
smoked conventional cigarettes.
This type of experiment would have several challenges. Because
smoking is a stigmatized behavior, individual self-reports are not
264. See Proposed E-Cigarette Rule, supra note 228, at 23,143 (clarifying that the FDA has
the authority to issue regulations to bring other tobacco products not explicitly mentioned in the
statute under the law so long as those products meet the statutory definition of tobacco product,
and e-cigarettes meet that definition).
265. Id. at 23,174.
266. See id. at 23,149 (including one of the health benefits of this rule as the “[e]limination of
‘light,’ ‘low,’ and ‘mild’ descriptors and other unproven modified risk claims”).
267. States and Municipalities with Laws Regulating Use of Electronic Cigarettes, AM.
NONSMOKERS’ RIGHTS FOUND. 1, http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/ecigslaws.pdf (last updated Jan. 1,
2016) [http://perma.cc/3H4D-H82A] [hereinafter U.S. State and Local Laws].
268. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-38-2.6 (West 2012) (listing exceptions to the general ban on
use of e-cigarettes in places of public access).
269. See U.S. State and Local Laws, supra note 267, at 1–3 (listing different states’
approaches to e-cigarette regulation).
270. See id. at 3–8 (listing different localities’ approaches to e-cigarette regulation).
271. See Bullen et al., supra note 247, at 1630 (stating that participants had said they “wanted
to quit smoking”).
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always reliable. Because it is a repetitive behavior, memories may not
be reliable even if reports are sincere. There is a strong possibility of
attrition. In the New Zealand study, the researchers observed a strong
dropout rate among the group that was randomly assigned nicotine
patches; the study speculated that some of these group members, who
joined the study in the hope of access to free e-cigarettes, grew
uninterested after they learned they had been assigned not to receive
them.272 Consistent with that theory, in the absence of a tight
moratorium, there may be crossover risk from control group members
who use e-cigarettes outside of the experimental conditions.
There are also practical and ethical limitations to what could be
learned from experiments. It would be useful to learn if non-smokers,
some of whom were randomly assigned to receive free e-cigarettes, were
more likely to start smoking conventional cigarettes. But it would be
impossible to justify the health harm to participants, even if they gave
informed consent. Randomized experiments with e-cigarettes obviously
cannot include minors, but how tightly e-cigarettes should be controlled
may ultimately hinge on how minors are affected. There also would not
be sufficient time in the experiment to observe the long-term health
effects of e-cigarette use itself, which could be just as important as ecigarettes’ causal effects on conventional smoking.
Even with these challenges and limitations, the case for
randomized experiments with e-cigarettes is strong. If e-cigarettes
really do help smokers quit, they should probably be commercially
available, and should definitely be available by prescription to current
smokers. If e-cigarettes lead to greater smoking, there is a plausible
argument for banning them outright, if the black market can be
effectively suppressed, or at least imposing more coercive restrictions.
The open question is whether regulations more restrictive than
the FDA’s proposed rule remains politically feasible. The political
economy of e-cigarette regulation has rapidly changed in the past few
years, leading to interest group entrenchment. An article published in
2013 stated that “[t]he industry [wa]s dominated by small, independent
companies, with the exception of blu eCigs, which was acquired in April
2012 by Lorillard Tobacco Company for $135 million.”273 Now, the other
major tobacco firms have followed Lorillard. In 2014, Altria acquired ecigarette maker Green Smoke.274 Reynolds American, which was
272. Id. at 1635 (“Some of the participants might have agreed to take part in the study to try
e-cigarettes, and then lost interest when randomised to patches.”).
273. Paradise, supra note 239, at 355.
274. Mike Esterl, Altria Expands in E-Cigarettes With Green Smoke, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3,
2014, 6:11 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ SB100014240527023046268045793605
52508696542[http://perma.cc/M7KL-YJ6Q].
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created by a merger of R.J. Reynolds and Brown & Williamson, planned
to introduce its own line of e-cigarettes, called Vuse.275 Interestingly,
later in 2014, Lorillard acquired Reynolds American, and in a sign of
how important the e-cigarettes market is expected to become, agreed to
sell blu to another major tobacco firm, Imperial Tobacco, to improve the
chances of the merger surviving antitrust review.276 In 2015, Japan
Tobacco acquired the e-cigarette company Logic Technology
Development.277
For a brief period, it was conceivable that the major tobacco
firms would view e-cigarettes as a threat, creating the possibility of a
Baptist-and-Bootlegger coalition between public health advocates and
tobacco firms for tighter e-cigarette regulation.278 But now that the
major tobacco firms have consolidated their position in the e-cigarette
market, one of the most powerful industries in Washington can oppose
tighter regulation of e-cigarettes.
Social norm entrenchment is happening as well. Some public
health scholars contend that tobacco use has declined in part because it
has been successfully stigmatized. For example, a recent article in the
New England Journal of Medicine explained that “[a]s information
about the hazards of sidestream smoke was publicized in the 1980s and
1990s, the imperative to protect ‘innocent bystanders’ moved to the
center of tobacco-control efforts, and public smoking bans pushed
smokers into the shadows. The once-widespread habit . . . became
highly stigmatized.”279 Now, “[m]arketing campaigns for e-cigarettes
threaten to reverse the successful, decades-long public health campaign
to denormalize smoking.”280 The renormalization may already be

275. Id.
276. See Mike Esterl & Peter Evans, Reynolds American to Buy Lorillard for $25 Billion,
WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2014 8:01 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/reynolds-american-to-buylorillard-for-27-4-billion-1405422823 [http://perma.cc/SJS9-667H].
277. Tripp Mickle, Japan Tobacco to Acquire U.S. Electronic Cigarette Company Logic
Technology Development, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2015, 11:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
japan-tobacco-to-acquire-u-s-electronic-cigarette-company-logic-technology-development1430423065 [http://perma.cc/Y84C-BP7T].
278. For the origin of this metaphor, see Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists—The
Education of a Regulatory Economist, REGULATION: AM. ENTERPRISE INST. J. ON GOV’T & SOC’Y,
May–June 1983, at 12, 13–14.
279. Amy L. Fairchild et al., The Renormalization of Smoking? E-Cigarettes and the Tobacco
“Endgame,” 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 293 (2014).
280. Id. To be clear, Fairchild and her colleagues are open to the possibility that e-cigarettes
can be a net positive for public health; in fact, they contend that “an unwillingness to consider ecigarette use until all risks or uncertainties are eliminated is dangerously close to dogmatism.” Id.
at 295. But they note that “strict denormalization strategies may be incompatible with e-cigarette
use.” Id.
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underway––in 2013, the New York Times declared in a headline:
“Smoking Is Back, Without the Stigma.”281
The status of the stigma is important for public health outcomes
because it might affect how many non-smokers start using e-cigarettes,
and possibly start smoking conventional cigarettes. But what makes it
relevant for entrenchment is that the electorate might be more
reluctant to support restrictive regulation on e-cigarettes if they do not
perceive e-cigarette use as stigmatized. The normative case for
imposing a moratorium solely to halt social norm entrenchment is
always uneasy. One person’s social norm entrenchment can be
another’s democratic deliberation. Yet there are three plausible
justifications in the case of e-cigarettes.
First, if firms are misleading consumers about the health effects
of e-cigarettes, that might justify discounting the value of decisions
based on that misleading information. After the Sottera decision, some
e-cigarette firms have been attempting to avoid making therapeutic
claims. For example, on its website, the Smoke-Free Alternatives Trade
Association, an e-cigarette trade association, claims: “While electronic
cigarettes are not smoking cessation tools nor are they marketed that
way, there may be anecdotal evidence that some people have reduced
or eliminated use of traditional cigarettes.”282 But there is evidence
that, in the words of one comment that the FDA received on the
proposed rule from public health scholars, “e-cigarette companies have
explicitly and implicitly made therapeutic claims about their products
in their online marketing and promotional materials” in the past.283 So
even if firms are no longer making these claims, the lingering effects of
earlier therapeutic claims in advertising may be contributing to the destigmatization. But, of course, this issue is impossible to resolve now
because the evidence on the therapeutic claims is mixed.
Second, cognitive dissonance might delay future acceptance of
evidence demonstrating worse than anticipated health risks from ecigarettes. There is evidence that smokers’ beliefs exhibit the effects of
cognitive dissonance, but that these beliefs fade when smokers quit.284
281. Steven Kurutz, Confounding a Smoking Ban, and Bouncers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/fashion/smoking-is-back-without-the-stigma.html
[http://perma.cc/2CFS-LNDZ].
282. E-Cig FAQs, supra note 226.
283. RACHEL GRANA ET AL., COMMENT SUBMITTED REGARDING FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS RELATED TO NICOTINE REPLACEMENT THERAPIES AND SMOKINGCESSATION PRODUCTS (2013), http://www.tobacco.ucsf.edu/sites/tobacco.ucsf.edu/files/u9/FDAcomment-ecig-cessation-1jx-835b-n9ph.pdf [http://perma.cc/EX5J-63GP].
284. Omid Fotuhi et al., Patterns of Cognitive Dissonance-Reducing Beliefs Among Smokers:
a Longitudinal Analysis from the International Tobacco Control (ITC) Four Country Survey, 22
TOBACCO CONTROL 52, 52 (2013).
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The combination of potentially misleading advertising early on, lax
regulation, and widespread use leading to de-stigmatization, could
bolster the effect of cognitive dissonance.
Third, there is a related possibility that cultural cognition could
influence assessment of future health and safety evidence about ecigarettes, as it influenced the reception of evidence about the health
risks of conventional cigarettes. A former Surgeon General stated that
“‘the diffusion of new knowledge . . . was impeded by the entrenched
norm of smoking, a widespread practice fueled by the persistent and
pervasive marketing of cigarettes.’”285 The public “did ultimately come
to believe the empirical information . . . only after a shift in social
meaning . . . made acceptance of that information compatible with a
diverse array of cultural outlooks.”286 To the extent that similar
perceptions develop for e-cigarettes, cultural cognition, rather than
pure normative disagreement, might motivate opposition to regulation.
C. Autonomous Vehicles
As of December 2015, Google reports that its autonomous cars
had travelled over 1.3 million miles autonomously on public
roadways.287 In 2014, Rio Tinto claimed that fully autonomous trucks
had logged 2.3 million kilometers at its mines in Australia.288 In 2012,
Volvo demonstrated the feasibility of linking cars in a computercontrolled “road train” so that they drive along a highway in tandem.289
Daimler has demonstrated that its autonomous Mercedes can navigate
traffic on the autobahn.290 In 2016, the Department of Transportation
announced a ten-year, $4 billion proposal to fund pilot programs for
autonomous vehicles, an acknowledgement that “partially and fully
automated vehicles are nearing the point at which widespread
285. Kahan, supra note 65, at 137–38 (quoting CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING TOBACCO USE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 40
(2000)).
286. Id. at 138.
287. See Google Self-Driving Car Project Monthly Report, GOOGLE 1 (2015),
https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en//selfdrivingcar/files/reports/report
-1215.pdf [http://perma.cc/29U5-MCVA] (specifying that since 2009, the project’s cars have driven
1,372,111 miles in autonomous mode).
288. See David Stringer, How Robots, Drones Are Transforming Mining and Mine Safety, INS.
J. (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/04/04/325475.htm
[http://perma.cc/B95A-GUJT].
289. Volvo’s Self-Drive “Convoy” Hits the Spanish Motorway, BBC NEWS (May 29, 2012, 6:08
AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-18248841 [http://perma.cc/4JJ9-2WWM].
290. See Joseph B. White, Mercedes Makes Driverless Ride, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324549004579065541926070378
[http://perma.cc/A2XU-RVKT].
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deployment is feasible.”291 The prospects of autonomous vehicles are no
longer science fiction and deserve serious scholarly and regulatory
attention.
The history of the current generation of research into
autonomous vehicles started with a government agency. In 2004, the
US military’s in-house think tank, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (“DARPA”), organized a competition, the DARPA
Grand Challenge, in which teams were to race autonomous vehicles
over a 142-mile route across the Mojave Desert to win a $1 million
prize.292 In the first DARPA Grand Challenge, no vehicle travelled more
than 7.5 miles, but by 2005 teams were successfully completing similar
courses, and by 2007 they were completing courses with traffic and
obstacles.293 In the past several years, development has shifted to the
private sector. Google’s project may be the most advanced and high
profile, but many of the major automakers now claim to be researching
semi- or fully autonomous vehicles.
1. Risks and Benefits
To understand the risks and benefits of autonomous vehicles, it
is important to distinguish among different degrees of automation. The
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) divides
autonomous vehicles into four levels, the most important and advanced
of which are Levels 3 and 4.294 Level 3 is “Limited Self-Driving
Automation,” which “enable[s] the driver to cede full control of all
safety-critical functions under certain traffic or environmental
conditions” and “rel[ies] heavily on the vehicle to monitor for changes
in those conditions requiring transition back to driver control.”295 Level
4 is “Full Self-Driving Automation.”296
Lower level technologies can bring significant safety benefits,
and NHTSA is starting to require some of them in new models.297 But

291. Bill Vlasic, U.S. Proposes Spending $4 Billion on Self-Driving Cars, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/business/us-proposes-spending-4-billion-on-selfdriving-cars.html [http://perma.cc/T8DH-X6VC].
292. The DARPA Grand Challenge: Ten Years Later, DEFENSE ADVANCED RES. PROJECTS
AGENCY (March 13, 2014), http://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2014-03-13 [http://perma.cc/4L4H2CA2].
293. See id.
294. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY
CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 4–5 (2013), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/
Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y46T-68P2].
295. Id. at 5.
296. Id.
297. See id.
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the effects of Level 4 autonomous vehicles could transform society.
Much of the discussion of the costs and benefits of autonomous vehicles
has, therefore, focused on a world in which Level 4 technologies are
widely available. The most recent estimates suggest that an estimated
32,675 Americans died in auto collisions in 2014.298 Many of those
crashes are due to driver error. In 2008, NHTSA issued a report to
Congress on the causes of motor vehicle collisions.299 The report itself
does not explicitly state what percentage of total collisions are
attributable to driver error, but the data the report presents has been
used to calculate the widely repeated claim that driver error accounts
for approximately 93% of collisions.300 For that reason alone, the
benefits of autonomous vehicles—at least with Level 4 technology—
could be staggering.
There are other significant benefits other than the body count.
Reducing collisions would save resources spent on auto repair, policing,
and adjudication, and because collisions would be less frequent, cars
might be designed lighter, reducing manufacturing costs and saving
fuel.301 Level 4 autonomous vehicles could also advance civil rights by
providing mobility to the elderly and the disabled.302 A change in
patterns of car ownership would trigger many of these economic
benefits.303 We take it for granted now that, outside of a few very dense
cities, individuals who can afford to do so will own cars and drive them
when needed, but otherwise leave them parked for most of the day.304
With fully autonomous vehicles, individuals might be able to sign up for
298. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., EARLY ESTIMATE OF MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC
FATALITIES IN 2014 1 (2015), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812160.pdf [http://perma.cc/
6KRN-E7DW].
299. See generally NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE
CRASH
CAUSATION
SURVEY
(2008),
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811059.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Z4G4-Z25L].
300. See Bryant Walker Smith, Human Error As A Cause of Vehicle Crashes, CTR. FOR
INTERNET & SOC’Y (Dec. 18, 2003, 3:15 PM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/12/humanerror-cause-vehicle-crashes [http://perma.cc/ZDN2-3RY7].
301. For a similar analysis from an industry expert who has consulted with Google’s selfdriving car project, see Brad Templeton, New Design Factors for Robot Cars, TEMPLETONS
http://www.templetons.com/brad/robocars/design-change.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2015)
[http://perma.cc/L55L-3RK5].
302. See, e.g., Sven A. Beiker, Legal Aspects of Autonomous Driving, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1145, 1151–52 (2012) (“[A]utonomous driving technology can help elderly or disabled citizens keep
an active lifestyle such as running daily errands and maintaining their social relationships.”).
303. See Templeton, supra note 301 (discussing the potential rise of car clubs and rentals,
which could trigger economic benefits).
304. See KPMG, SELF-DRIVING CARS: ARE WE READY? 30 (2013), https://www.kpmg.com/US/
en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/self-driving-cars-are-we-ready.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AFN3-RK6U] (discussing focus group responses to the question of whether
consumers would be willing to abandon individual ownership).

2016]

REGULATION OF EMERGING RISKS

467

a service that sends whatever car is available to them on demand. Think
of today’s ridesharing services like Uber and Lyft, but without human
drivers. In this way, individuals may no longer be responsible for
purchasing and maintaining privately owned cars, and cars would no
longer sit idle in driveways or parking garages. They might be used
much more efficiently, reducing congestion and the total number of
vehicles on the road, diminishing the need for highways as the distance
between cars necessary for safety (and thus the total space needed for
the same volume of cars) decreases, and freeing up valuable land
currently devoted to parking.305
Level 4 autonomous vehicles would bring risks as well. Because
they will make riding by car less expensive, they might have the effect
of increasing the amount of total miles traveled.306 That could raise fuel
consumption, although that effect might be counterbalanced by
ridesharing services owning more electric vehicles, with a smaller set
of gasoline-powered vehicles reserved for infrequent, long trips outside
of an electric vehicle’s range. The reduced cost of travel might also
change land use patterns by encouraging suburban sprawl.307
Some scholars have worried that the ease of tracking
autonomous vehicles might reduce privacy.308 Others speculate that
autonomous vehicles will be hacked by criminals or terrorists.309 But
the most significant negative effect is orthogonal to risk regulation: the
potential for massive, sudden unemployment, concentrated among
unskilled workers and workers with non-transferable skills.310 A world
without a need for taxi, bus, and truck drivers, and less of a need for
workers in the auto manufacturing, auto parts, auto repair, and auto
insurance industries might be a world with an unemployment problem
that might compare to the unemployment effects of deindustrialization.
The pervasive uncertainty surrounding how society will adjust
to fully autonomous vehicles makes speculative any suggestions about
what regulatory regime should govern their use in the long term. But
305. See Bryant Walker Smith, Managing Autonomous Transportation Demand, 52 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1401, 1412–13 (2012).
306. See id. at 1417–18.
307. See id.
308. See generally Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1171 (2012) (discussing privacy concerns).
309. See Frank Douma & Sarah Aue Palodichuk, Criminal Liability Issues Created by
Driverless Cars, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1157, 1164–68 (2012).
310. For an analysis of the potential employment effects of autonomous vehicles in the context
of the broader effects of automation on the workforce, see generally ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON &
ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF
BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES (2014).
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despite the significant risks and costs, it is difficult to dispute that, if
autonomous vehicles can prevent most of the tens of thousands of
deaths and hundreds of thousands of injuries vehicle collisions cause,
they should be encouraged. The best policy for smoothing the transition
to autonomous vehicles might require regulation.
2. Existing Regulation
The 1966 National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act grants
NHTSA broad authority to “prescribe motor vehicle safety
standards.”311 In a law review article published in 2012, four NHTSAaffiliated lawyers outlined how NHTSA might implement that
authority, stating that the agency could “establish safety standards
applicable to vehicles that are originally manufactured with
autonomous capabilities and to aftermarket equipment that could be
added to vehicles . . . to convert them into autonomous vehicles.”312
So far, however, NHTSA’s role in autonomous vehicle policy has
been limited to research and voluntary guidelines.313 In 2013, NHTSA
issued a preliminary statement of policy, which stated that the agency
“believe[s] that states are well suited to address issues such as
licensing, driver training, and conditions for operation related to
specific types of vehicles.”314 The statement explains that, “[w]hile
NHTSA’s authority, expertise, and mandate is to establish uniform,
national standards needed for vehicle safety, the agency recognizes that
premature regulation can run the risk of putting the brakes on the
evolution toward increasingly better vehicle safety technologies.”315 But
NHTSA nonetheless recommended guidelines for state regulation,
discouraging states from permitting autonomous vehicles on the road
for purposes other than testing, and suggesting how testing might be
regulated for safety.316
In 2016, however, NHTSA released an update to their
preliminary statement of policy. Recognizing that “partially and fully
automated vehicles are nearing the point at which widespread
deployment is feasible,” the statement commits NHTSA to releasing

311. 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (2012).
312. Stephen P. Wood et al., The Potential Regulatory Challenges of Increasingly Autonomous
Motor Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1423, 1439 (2012). Their argument relies on the statutory
definition provisions in 49 U.S.C. § 30102 (2012).
313. For a description of its current research plans, see NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN, supra note 294, at 5–9.
314. Id. at 10.
315. Id.
316. See id. at 11–14.
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best-practice guidance for the safe operation of Level 4 autonomous
vehicles within six months.317
Five states have enacted statutes to govern autonomous
vehicles318—California,319 Florida,320 Nevada,321 Michigan,322 and
Tennessee.323 So has the District of Columbia.324 California325 and
Nevada326 have promulgated regulations to implement the new
statutes. California has set up a permitting system to control testing of
autonomous vehicles.327 Nevada has provided for a special license.328
Both states rely on the continuing presence of human operators.
California requires that a human driver be “seated in the vehicle’s
driver seat and either: monitoring its operations and able to take over
physical control of the vehicle; or, in physical control of the vehicle.”329
Nevada requires that at least two humans ride in any autonomous
vehicle on public roadways, “one of whom is the operator and must at
all times be seated in a position which allows the person to take
complete control of the vehicle, including, without limitation, control of
the steering, throttle and brakes.”330 So even if firms are testing Level
4 technology, California and Nevada expect that a human driver will
act as if the vehicle had only Level 3 technology.
In the absence of federal legislation or regulation, the legal
status of autonomous vehicles in other states is not obvious. In 2014,
one scholar undertook a survey of every state’s vehicle code331 and

317. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT/NHTSA POLICY STATEMENT
CONCERNING “AUTOMATED VEHICLES”: 2016 UPDATE TO “PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY
CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES,” 1 (2016), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/
Autonomous-Vehicles-Policy-Update-2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/4JWW-4LHM].
318. For a compilation of relevant state bills, statutes, and regulations, see Gabriel Weiner &
Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving: Legislative and Regulatory Action, CTR. FOR INTERNET
&
SOC’Y:
WIKI,
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/Automated_Driving:
_Legislative_and_Regulatory_Action [http://perma.cc/2VLF-8MKH] (last visited Oct. 18, 2015).
319. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2015).
320. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.85 (West 2012).
321. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482a (West 2015).
322. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.244 (West 2014).
323. See TENN. CODE ANN. §55-8-202 (2015).
324. See D.C. CODE § 50-2352 (2007).
325. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227.22 (2015).
326. See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A (2013).
327. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227.26 (2015).
328. See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.110 (2013).
329. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227.34 (2015).
330. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.130 (2013).
331. See Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States,
1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411, 463–500 (2014).
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concluded that “[c]urrent law probably does not prohibit automated
vehicles.”332
3. Prescriptions
Autonomous vehicles differ from fracking and e-cigarettes in
that there is no isolatable factual question that regulators need to
answer quickly. A randomized experiment may not be necessary.
Instead, regulators need to monitor the development of autonomous
vehicles to ensure that the state will pick up on any of the speculative
risks like hacking or, more importantly, any risks that are unforeseen,
so that rapid intervention is possible.
But there is a strong case for controlling the testing of
autonomous vehicles on reverse entrenchment grounds. One potential
obstacle to public acceptance is that early, high profile collisions will
turn public sentiment against the new technology and lead to
legislation that impedes its development. One leading automotive
technology researcher has stated that “[i]t is unclear how courts,
regulators, and the public will react to accidents involving robotic cars.
Overreaction is a clear danger, even if could it be shown that a
transition to autonomous vehicles leads to far fewer traffic-related
deaths over all.”333 This type of worry is familiar from the history of
emerging technologies. As one historian puts it, “we have seen
examples in which a single incident gone awry undermined years of
careful planning and building of regulatory systems.”334
With autonomous vehicles, one potential risk is that firms will
market cars with level 3 technologies, which will have the perverse
effect of increasing collisions. This theory of risk is based on the premise
that, once human drivers come to rely on partial automation, their
driving skills may atrophy, or they may just become dangerously
inattentive, so that they will not be prepared to take over in the event
of an emergency. For this reason, both NHTSA and private firms have
emphasized the importance of human-machine interface research.335
These concerns resemble familiar worries in aviation safety. For
example, France’s civil aviation safety investigation authority
determined that analogous human-machine interaction problems

333. Beiker, supra note 302, at 1152.
334. Gary E. Marchant et al., What Does the History of Technology Regulation Teach Us About
Nano Oversight?, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 724, 725; see also Beiker, supra note 302, at 1152 (listing
as examples the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster, genetically modified “Starlink” corn, and the
death of Jesse Gelsinger, a participant in an early gene therapy clinical trial).
335. See Wood et al., supra note 312, at 1472-76; Beiker, supra note 302, at 1154.
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contributed to the crash of Air France Flight 447 over the Atlantic
Ocean in 2009.336
Federal regulation could significantly reduce the risk of reverse
entrenchment by controlling experimentation and ensuring that all
firms take sufficient care to avoid collisions that could impede public
acceptance. Note that, even if the median firm takes due care, the whole
industry could be set back by a collision caused by just one negligent
outlier firm.
The best regulatory strategy to ease the transition to
autonomous vehicles may be to prohibit firms from testing vehicles with
Level 3 technologies on public roads. The political complication with
this strategy is that it appears that Google and the major automakers
have diverged on whether Level 3 technologies should be used. Until
May 2014, Google had been testing autonomous vehicles with Level 3
technologies. As The New York Times reported, “[t]here were no
crashes. But Google engineers realized that asking a human
passenger—who could be reading or daydreaming or even sleeping—to
take over in an emergency won’t work.”337 The Google researchers “‘saw
stuff that made [them] a little nervous.’”338 So Google is now testing
fully autonomous, Level 4 vehicles limited to 25 miles per hour.339
But most of the major automakers, perhaps because their brands
are bound up with the appeal of the driving experience or perhaps
because they anticipate that fully autonomous vehicles will bring the
end of individual car ownership, “favor an incremental approach to selfdriving cars, in which features such as lane centering and parking
assistance are gradually integrated into vehicles.”340
So the automakers may resist mandating Level 4 technologies.
But the interests of Google and any other firm that takes its Level-4-orbust approach may be roughly aligned with the interests of federal
regulators over the medium term. These firms might actually support
federal regulation if it would reduce the risk of reverse entrenchment
336. See

generally BUREAU D’ENQUÊTES ET D’ANALYSES POUR LA SÉCURITÉ DE
FINAL REPORT ON THE ACCIDENT ON 1ST JUNE 2009 TO THE AIRBUS A330-203
REGISTERED F-GZCP OPERATED BY AIR FRANCE FLIGHT AF 447 RIO DE JANEIRO-PARIS 2009 (2012),
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf [http://perma.cc/ D9LDUZXB] (reporting the details and theory behind flight AF447’s crash over the Atlantic in 2009).
337. See John Markoff, Google’s Next Phase in Driverless Cars: No Brakes or Steering Wheel,
N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/technology/googles-next-phase-indriverless-cars-no-brakes-or-steering-wheel.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/GPE4-C7RF].
338. Id.
339. See id.
340. Alexei Oreskovic & Ben Klayman, Google, Detroit Diverge on Road Map for Self-Driving
Cars, REUTERS (June 30, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/30/us-google-detroitinsight-idUSKBN0F50C320140630 [http://perma.cc/6NG2-LY8T].
L’AVIATIONCIVILE,
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or at least give them a competitive advantage over the automakers. So
far, however, NHTSA has not shown interest in this type of approach.
In its initial policy statement, NHTSA “strongly recommend[ed] that
states require that a properly licensed driver be seated in the driver’s
seat and ready to take control of the vehicle while the vehicle is
operating in self-driving mode on public roads.”341
Which side has more influence is unclear. By market
capitalization and lobbying expenditures,342 Google is far more powerful
than a typical innovator start-up, but its potential adversaries—the
major automakers—are some of the most powerful firms in the nation.
So the political opportunity autonomous vehicles presents is not as
straightforward as it would be for the typical emerging risk. But the
benefits of controlled testing—and a moratorium to protect against
collisions outside of the tests—might justify regulatory intervention.
V. SECOND BEST STRATEGIES UNDER EXISTING LAW
The robust Experimentalist model of regulation this Article
defends would require a statute. Given how infrequently Congress has
enacted new statutes in recent years, one should be skeptical about any
proposal that requires statutory reform. This Part considers how
agencies might be able to implement experiments and moratoria under
existing law. It is important to note at the outset that there is no general
statutory barrier to conducting regulatory experiments. Agencies have
issued rules that function as experiments under existing statutes,343
and the absence of more experimental rules need not be explained by a
lack of statutory authority. It may be that regulated firms do not want
to bet on rules that might generate evidence of their own disutility.344
Even randomized experiments are possible under existing law.
Hard look review should not pose a problem because “an agency should
be able to justify employing a randomized experiment on the ground
that this approach could provide information relevant to the
administrative process.”345 But this is only true if an agency goes
through the “ordinary notice-and-comment process”346—the process

341. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 294, at 12.
342. See, e.g., Tom Hamburger & Matea Gold, Google, Once Disdainful of Lobbying, Now a
Master of Washington Influence, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/how-google-is-transforming-power-and-politicsgoogle-once-disdainful-of-lobbying-now-amaster-of-washington-influence/2014/04/12/51648b92-b4d3-11e3-8cb6284052554d74_story.html.
343. For examples, see Gubler, supra note 9, at 149–54.
344. See id. at 156.
345. Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 981.
346. Id. at 980.
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that, along with cost-benefit analysis and judicial review, stymies early
attempts to regulate emerging risks. This Article has argued that
agencies need to be able to start experiments on emerging risks before
they have sufficient information to survive a conventional rulemaking,
and they need to be able to use experimental results to generate rules
before entrenchment has precluded regulatory options.
This Part analyzes two strategies to permit agencies to conduct
experiments and impose moratoria on emerging risks without going
through the conventional rulemaking process. First, agencies could
bypass notice-and-comment rulemaking by adopting interim final rules.
Second, they could expedite the rulemaking process by working towards
a negotiated regulation with interested parties.
Each of these approaches is a second best strategy. The legal
provisions on which they rely were not designed for the purpose of
allowing a flexible response to emerging risks. For many emerging
risks, these strategies would not be legal or practical. But in some cases,
they might provide agencies useful workarounds to the brittle
rulemaking process that might otherwise impede sensible regulation.
A. Interim Final Rules
Interim final rules “are rules adopted by federal agencies that
become effective without prior notice and public comment and that
invite post-effective public comment.”347 Agencies possess the power to
promulgate interim final rules because of a statutory exception in the
APA, which provides that an agency need not follow notice and
comment procedures “when the agency for good cause finds . . . that
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest.”348
The process of using an interim final rule works as follows. First,
an agency makes a legal determination that it has good cause to deviate
from conventional notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.349 The
agency can then promulgate its interim final rule immediately. Next,
an agency decides to accept comments on the rule after it has gone into
effect.350 Agencies are not legally obligated to solicit post-effective
comments, but it is a sound strategy because “[t]he fact that the agency
solicited and considered the post-effective comments in good faith might
347. Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 703, 704
(1999).
348. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2012).
349. See Asimow, supra note 347, at 710 (describing the occasions for adopting interim-final
rules without public participation).
350. See id. at 711 (noting that “[s]olicitation of post-effective comments” is voluntary).
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persuade a court that the agency’s initial good cause claim was
justified.”351 After an agency receives the post-effective comments on
the interim rule, it can, following conventional rulemaking procedures,
proceed to adopt a final rule.352
Interim final rules are not unheard of in practice. In fact,
empirical evidence suggests that “interim final rulemaking ha[s] been
increasing over time.”353 Agencies are also more likely to use interim
final rules when the stakes are high.354 According to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), between 2003 and 2010, agencies used
interim final rules for 15% of major rules355—a category that includes
all rules that are likely to result in effects of $100 million or more per
year.356 By contrast, agencies only used interim final rules for 4% of
nonmajor rules.357
The appeal of interim final rules for regulating emerging risks
is considerable. When an agency confronts an emerging risk, it could
use an interim final rule to impose a moratorium or other limits on the
risky technology. It could then organize experiments with the risky
technology without allowing entrenchment to occur. When the
experiments were completed, the agency could use the conventional
rulemaking process to arrive at a final rule, making sure to consider
post-effective comments from outside parties to increase its chances of
surviving judicial review.
The main obstacle to agencies using interim final rules to
regulate emerging risks is satisfying the good cause exception.
Unfortunately, “[n]umerous judicial decisions, well supported by the
legislative history, establish that the APA’s good cause provision is
narrowly construed.”358 Although an interim final rule is more likely to
be upheld if the agency makes it effective only for a temporary period,359
351. Id.
352. See id. at 722–23 (discussing the adoption of what the author calls a “final-final rule,” a
process that includes “modifying and finalizing an interim-final rule”).
353. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 930 (2008). For empirical evidence indicating
that direct and interim final rulemaking have increased since the 1980s, see id. at 931.
354. For a discussion of recent trends in the use of notice and comment rulemaking and its
substitutes, see Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1160–67 (2014).
355. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-21, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES COULD
TAKE
ADDITIONAL
STEPS
TO
RESPOND
TO
PUBLIC
COMMENTS
41
(2012),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651052.pdf [http://perma.cc/E9ZB-VCJF].
356. See 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (2012) (defining a “major rule”).
357. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 355, at 41.
358. Asimow, supra note 347, at 719.
359. See id. at 724 (indicating that courts are more likely to uphold interim final rules when
the rules are limited and have a brief duration).
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the D.C. Circuit has held that “the limited nature of the rule cannot in
itself justify a failure to follow notice and comment procedures.”360
For emerging risks, whether the good cause exception applies
would depend on the facts of the particular case. This whole area of
doctrine is “exceedingly factbound.”361 In general, the courts have
demanded that agencies seeking to invoke the exception demonstrate
exigent circumstances.362 It is possible that “[a] public health or safety
emergency or an environmental crisis . . . potentially qualifies.”363 But
the cases in which such an emergency has been held to justify the good
cause exception—a spate of helicopter accidents, a threat of extinction
during an ongoing hunting season, and the allocation of landing slots at
Reagan National Airport—reflect a genuine urgency that the
development of a new risky technology may not create.364 The most
high-profile recent case about the good cause exception, Jifry v. FAA,365
involved the Federal Aviation Administration’s decision to forgo noticeand-comment rulemaking for a rule allowing the agency to revoke the
pilot certificates of non-resident aliens automatically upon receiving
notification that the pilot posed a security risk366—a risk arguably more
urgent than the risks addressed here.
One further complication is that, for many emerging risks, the
need for quick restrictions is not potential harm from the technology
itself, but the threat of entrenchment foreclosing regulatory options. It
is difficult to imagine an agency arguing for a good cause exception to
the notice and comment provisions on the ground that the agency’s
regulatory options might elapse because of changes in interest group
power or social norms, at least given the strong judicial practice of
institutional formalism.367
360. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 969 F.2d 1141, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Council
of S. Mountains, Inc. v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
361. Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1123
(2009).
362. See Asimow, supra note 347, at 720 (providing examples of circumstances that would
implicate the good cause exception, including impracticability, public health and safety, or
situations “contrary to the public interest”).
363. Id.
364. See id. n.64 (listing cases regarding the good cause exception).
365. 370 F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
366. See id. at 1179 (showing that the good cause exception can apply in this situation, in
which “delay could result in serious harm” and pose a threat to TSA and FAA security).
367. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional
and Public Law, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2013) (showing that under the institutional formalism
model, courts generalize the functions of government entities and fail to take into account how the
institutions work). Pildes argues, however, that judicial review of agency action under the hard
look doctrine is an exception in that courts are willing to engage in a “ ‘realist’ political-economy
analysis of agency functioning.” Id. at 22.
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But when an emerging risk itself poses a risk of urgent harm to
health, safety, or the environment and the moratorium would prevent
that harm, it might be possible for agencies to prevail under the good
cause exception. It is conceivable that such a rationale could have
persuaded a court at the moment a new risky product like e-cigarettes
was introduced. If fracking had had the attention of regulators before it
became commercially viable, there too it is conceivable that an agency
could have persuasively cited a potential risk to health or the
environment. But both of these examples would more likely have come
out the other way. The doctrine is too factbound to generate strong
predictions, and agencies have not even attempted to use interim final
rules to regulate emerging risks.
If an agency could prevail under the good cause exception,
however, an interim final rule would improve on the conventional
rulemaking process. If one agency successfully adopted an interim final
rule to temporarily limit a new risky technology, it might establish a
beachhead precedent for the regulation of emerging risks.
B. Negotiated Regulation
Negotiated regulation allows agencies to expedite rulemaking by
dealing directly with the parties it was designed to benefit. It is “a
consensus-based process, usually convened by an agency, through
which stakeholders negotiate the substance of a rule.”368 Although
agencies have engaged in negotiated rulemakings since at least the
early 1980s,369 the current practice was codified in 1990 through the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act (NRA).370
The basic procedure is as follows. First, the agency “determine[s]
that a negotiated rule making is in the public interest and [announces]
the formation of a negotiating committee in the Federal Register so that
members of the public may apply to participate.”371 Once convened, the
“negotiating committee seeks to produce a consensus rule that will
either be proposed intact by the agency in [a notice of proposed
rulemaking] or form the basis of the proposed rule.”372

368. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1, 34 (1997).
369. See id. at 34–35 (describing Philip Harter’s work in 1982 to developed negotiated rulemaking). For an early defense of the practice, see generally Philip J. Harter, Negotiating
Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982).
370. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–70 (2012). For the history of the act, see Freeman, supra note 368, at 36–
37.
371. Freeman, supra note 368, at 37.
372. Id.
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Rules promulgated through negotiated regulation “are still
subject to notice and comment” even if the parties in the committee
arrive at a consensus.373 In addition, NRA provides that “[a] rule which
is the product of negotiated rulemaking and is subject to judicial review
shall not be accorded any greater deference by a court than a rule which
is the product of other rulemaking procedures.”374
Proponents of negotiated rulemaking argue that the process
“improves rule quality, reduces transaction costs and increases
legitimacy.”375 Opponents charge that it concentrates too much power
in private parties and allows them to steer regulation away from the
public interest.376 They emphasize empirical evidence that negotiated
rulemaking does not save time377 and does not reduce litigation.378
These debates, however, are fought at the level of the practice of
negotiated regulation as a whole. The empirical results that raise doubt
about the efficiency gains of negotiated regulation reflect aggregate
numbers. For any particular regulatory problem, negotiated
rulemaking may still be sound policy.
One advantage of negotiated regulation that is relevant for
emerging risks is its potential for agencies and interested parties to
learn more from each other than they would under conventional
rulemaking procedures. Participants in negotiated regulations
frequently report that they learned from the process, particularly about
the scientific and technical aspects of a proposed rule.379
The regulation of autonomous vehicles is a prime candidate for
negotiated rulemaking. NHTSA, by its own statements and actions, is
not prepared or sufficiently informed to enter the conventional noticeand-comment rulemaking process. But, as Part IV argued, there is a
strong case for early regulation to forestall reverse social norm
entrenchment. Fortuitously, the set of firms developing autonomous
373. Id.
374. 5 U.S.C. § 570.
375. Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit,
9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 60 (2000).
376. See generally William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory
Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351 (1997) (asserting that
private parties that negotiate rules bargain to achieve their own interests, making it the parties’
rule, not the public’s). For a skeptical take on negotiated regulation as part of a broader critique
of the developments in administrative law that have enhanced the power of private parties, see
generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, American Administrative Law Under Siege: Is Germany a
Model?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1279 (1994).
377. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1278–86 (1997) (calculating the length of a rulemaking).
378. See id. at 1286–309 (examining legal challenges to negotiated rules).
379. See Freeman & Langbein, supra note 375, at 88 (describing the learning outcomes of
regulatory negotiation).
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vehicles is small, and they are all sophisticated repeat players in the
regulatory process. There is also a broad consensus about the ultimate
goal of regulation: to smooth the transition to a world with dramatically
fewer traffic fatalities.
The challenge, of course, is that at the present moment, Google
and the automakers differ on how that transition should best be
achieved. But it is possible that, with NHTSA convening, a negotiated
rulemaking might lead the parties to converge on a consensus set of
rules for regulating autonomous vehicles. Short of granting NHTSA the
powers defended here, negotiated regulation may be the most promising
option.
Other emerging risks might resemble autonomous vehicles in
their suitability for negotiated regulation, especially if the parties to the
rulemaking could be expected to arrive at a consensus. Nanotechnology
might be one such risk. But, for most emerging risks, the politics of
regulation are too contentious for negotiated rulemaking to provide a
solution. For regulating those risks, agencies need the experiment and
moratorium powers they currently lack.
CONCLUSION
For most of modern history, medicine was a net negative for
human health. If one contracted an illness during the era of
bloodletting, the wisest response may have been to avoid medical care
altogether. Science knew so little about disease and how to treat it that
existing treatments did more harm than good. But in the twenty-first
century, although evidence-based medicine is still a work in progress
and some ineffective and many not-cost-justified practices persist, basic
medical science has advanced far enough that one should not think
twice about seeking medical treatment.
There may be a similar story to tell about regulation. Scientific
understanding of health and environmental risks has developed
dramatically over the past several decades, so regulators are more
likely to know what evidence is reliable, what theories are plausible,
and what further tests ought to be done. It may be that, in a world in
which the risk of regulatory error was high, waiting to let risks develop
before acting—or cutting them off permanently at the start—was good
policy. But now that we know more about how to regulate, maybe we
should be more willing to experiment with regulation on the next risk.

